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ABSTRACT
The objective of this research is to critically examine the potential of Egypt’s central
Investment Promotion Agency (IPA) to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and
therefore contribute in boosting the country’s economic development.
In quest of achieving this objective, the research applies a qualitative methodological
approach of a single case study analysis, where it investigates several legislative and
institutional elements to understand the extent to which the structure of the General
Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI) enables it to perform its role as the
national agency responsible for investment promotion. The analysis explains various
aspects that define the effectiveness of GAFI’s structure, such as the authority level,
tools, degree of political autonomy, and the different promotional functions performed.
The detailed scrutiny of different organizational and functional elements reveals that the
overall structure of GAFI does not contribute to its likelihood of being an effective
agency, and therefore exposes its limited role in promoting and facilitating private
investments. The findings explain how GAFI’s legal status accounts for weakening its
structure and further articulate how the Authority lags behind in performing the main
promotional functions of image building, investment generation, investor servicing and
facilitation, and policy advocacy; all of which that influence Egypt’s ability to attract
foreign investment, enhance local economy and guarantee better linkages to global
economy. Thus, the research offers some recommendations to help policy makers adopt
better mechanisms that could enhance the performance of GAFI, such as, ensuring the
separation between GAFI’s role as a regulator and executor on one side, and its role as
promoter and facilitator on the other side.
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Chapter One:
Study Overview

I.

Introduction
There is consensus on the importance of investment as a determinant of economic

growth, especially in the developing world, where private sector is the largest employer,
providing almost 90% of jobs (Stampeni et al., 2013). However, low levels of private
sector productive investments appear to be a major obstacle to economic growth in
developing countries (Saif and Ghoneim, 2013).
Successful international experiences have shown that creating a stable and
conducive environment for business and investment through progressive macroeconomic
policies and structural policy reform can lead to high levels of investments. However,
many researchers (Moore and Schmitz, 2008; Rodrik, 2005; and Hausmann et al., 2007)
have stressed that regulatory reform should not be the only focus of policy and research.
They emphasized that an equal focus should also be given to the importance of
circumstances in the different countries, where institutions play a pivotal role in
responding to investors’ needs, and in shaping the dynamics of private investments.
Government intervention in economy through investment promotion was firstly
drawn attention to by Wells and Wint, as a particular type of marketing activity that must
be carried out by governments seeking to pull in more foreign direct investment (FDI)
(Trnik, 2007). Over the past three decades, it can be found that investment promotion is
highly associated with significant FDI growth (Figure 1). But, even though there is a
spread of national Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) - seeking to stimulate growth
and development by offering investment incentives, investor services and other means to
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encourage investors and draw more FDI-, the problem of low investment levels still
exists in developing countries (Casey, 2013).
Figure (1): Global FDI Inflows by Group of Economies 2005-2015, and Projections, 20162018, (Bil. US$)

Source: UNCTAD. (2016).

Moving in tandem with the global economy, Egypt has moved from a public
sector dominated economy to a private sector led economy with the announcement of an
open door policy for foreign investment and markets in the 1970’s, and created the
General Authority For Investment and Free Zones (GAFI), as a dedicated national IPA to
promote and attract FDI in Egypt.
In the past 15 years, private investments have become a key contributor to the
growth of the Egyptian economy. Between 2002 and 2014, the total implemented
investments have nearly tripled to reach EGP 265 billion, which is equivalent to an
average annual growth rate of almost 26% (CBE, 2014; MoPMAR, 2015). Furthermore,
private investments made up 62% of the total implemented investments in 2014,
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compared to only 49% in 2003 (CBE, 2014; MoPMAR, 2015). However, the levels of
private investments have declined sharply post the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 and the
transitional periods, Egypt has been going through. Many impediments have resulted
from political, economic, legal and judicial instability, resulting in a continued
deterioration of Egypt’s rank for several consecutive years in the Global Competitiveness
Reports of the World Economic Forum. A significant decline was observed in
“Macroeconomic Environment” and “Institutions” pillars, in addition to the strength of
investor protection (WEF, 2015). The growth rate was limited to 2%, the government
budget deficit reached unprecedented levels recording EGP 166.7 billion for 2012 (MoF,
2013), and FDI inflows, one of the main sources for foreign currency, has significantly
decreased by 19% between 2012 and 2013 (UNCTAD, 2014). Even though Egypt
regained some stability after 2013, FDI levels remain very low.
Although academic debates concentrated on the low levels of private investments
in the past years, the discussions and solutions offered to developing countries were only
limited to improving the investment climate by focusing on regulatory frameworks
(Abdel-Latif and Schmitz, 2011). Existing researches give less attention to IPAs and their
characteristics that account for effectiveness in attracting more FDI, and the dynamics of
private investment resulting from institutional differences continue to be underresearched.
Focusing on institutional differences, best practices and rigorous studies have
verified a number of elements that highly influence the capacity of IPAs to operate
effectively and in turn attract more FDI. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to highlight
the institutionalized approach to attract private investments by focusing on the structure
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of Egypt’s national IPA; GAFI to explore whether it enables or impedes performing its
promotional role and hence contribute to the likelihood of attracting more FDI. This will
take place through examining the agency’s organizational and functional elements,
besides investigating the current regulatory framework that governs its operations.
II.

Research Questions, Scope, and Importance of the Study
a. Research Questions
The focal research question for this thesis is:

To what extent do the structure and legislative framework of GAFI enable it to
perform its role as the national Investment Promotion Agency of Egypt?
The research tries to answer this main question by centering on the main
institutional and legislative frameworks of GAFI and investigating how they
influence the significance of its role in attracting and facilitating private investments
in Egypt. The following are the research sub-questions.
1. To what extent does the New Investment Law No. 17/2015 affect the operation of
GAFI?
2. How does the organizational capacity of GAFI influence its ability to act as an
effective IPA?
3. How does GAFI perform its role in investment promotion?
4. How far do GAFI’s organizational characteristics affect its institutional functions?
b. Importance of the Study
The importance of this study stems from three reasons; first, there is a dearth of
academic research on the dynamics of private investment and institutional capacities that
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control the ability of countries to attain successful reforms and increase private
investment levels. Most of the academic debates that focus on low levels of private
investments in developing countries are only limited to discussions of improving the
regulatory frameworks and offering standardized recommendations presented by
international agencies. This study contributes to the literature, by offering an in-depth
institutional analysis to one of the developing countries IPAs. Hence, it fills a gap with
regards to institutional differences in attracting investment.
Second, the majority of studies assessing the performance of IPAs used empirical
methods, while this is a qualitative study. Therefore, it contributes to the knowledge of
investment promotion agencies in developing countries using a qualitative approach, by
selecting Egypt’s IPA as a case study, and providing in depth information on its role and
institutional functions.
The third reason pertains to the relative novelty of Investment Law No. 17/2015,
and the attempt to analyze it, with regards to the prerogatives it offers to GAFI, which in
turn determine its powers and influence its performance.
c. Scope of the Study
The research entails providing a picture of GAFI as an institution, identifying the
main obstacles hindering it from performing its promotional role, whether they are
organizational, functional, or legal constraints. The scope of the study involves:
o

Investigating the current governing investment law, and accordingly explain the
prerogatives and powers given to GAFI.

o

Investigating the organizational elements that influence GAFI’s structure, and
therefore its promotional mandates.
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o

Analyzing GAFI’s current institutional functions based on IPAs’ best practices
and explaining how they are influenced by the organizational elements.
Based of the analysis, the research also seeks to offer recommendations that will

further help policy-makers to close the implementation gaps between laws and practice
and enable them to formulate policies and adopt better mechanisms that contribute
positively to the investment environment in Egypt.
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Chapter Two:
Literature Review on Investment Promotion

This chapter will present and summarize the current state of knowledge on
investment promotion and its agencies. It will begin with the important role of institutions
in attracting private investments; followed by IPAs in particular, discussing their
structures and functions in detail; moving on to the importance of the legislative context;
and concluding with a summary on the existing studies on investment promotion.
It is worth noting that most of the literature on investment promotion and IPAs are
driven from few international organizations; namely the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD); the World Bank’s Foreign Investment Advisory
Service (FIAS), especially from the profound contribution of Louis Wells, Alvin Wint
(1990; 2000), Jacques Morisset, and Kelly Andrews-Johnson (2004); and Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). This can be attributed to the practical nature of this domain,
where most of the existent researches were aimed at assessing the effectiveness of IPAs,
or enhancing its work and other investment-related policies. Even though, such
researches and reports were not meant for academic purposes, they serve as foundations
for carrying out further academic research.
I.

Institutions and Investment Promotion
Governments usually link achieving higher economic growth with attracting more

FDI. Therefore, many efforts were exerted from host country governments to reach this
objective, including opening up to market economy, granting incentives to investors from
source countries, and improving macro-economic and micro-economic conditions (Trnik,
14

2007). Yet, these efforts did not necessarily assure achieving the projected FDI levels and
thus opened the gate for more efforts to take place in a more institutionalized approach.
Within this context, originated the concept of investment promotion, emerging from a
greater literature on the role of government in steering the economy, where two
fundamental contending approaches lie; the neoclassical versus the interventionist
paradigms.
The neoclassical approach to investment promotion is mainly based on the
assumption that governments of host countries should only focus on creating good
investment climates and change the incentive structure. It considers this as the principal
mean, by which investors will automatically be intrigued to seek the most advantageous
investment opportunities (Lim, 2008; Morisset & Andrews-Johnson, 2004). In contrast,
the interventionist approach argues that, this role is insufficient, due to the existing
market failures resulting from information gaps, believing that intervention is necessary
to help address these failures and yield favorable results in terms of attracting more
foreign investments (Morisset & Andrews-Johnson, 2004).
Following the interventionist approach, the role of institutions in attracting and
enhancing investment, either domestic or foreign has been discussed widely, as it is
believed that institutional quality influences economic growth partly through the amount
of investments attracted (Valeriani and Peluso, 2011; Buchanan, Le, and Rishi, 2012).
North and Weingast (1989) discussed the role of political institutions in particular and the
importance of an existing system of checks and balances that can favorably affect
investment by permitting governments to be more credible and commit to not engaging in
ex-post opportunism with investors or exposing them to other risks. They also pointed at
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greater variability in levels of private investment within a set of observations in different
countries, where checks and balances were low.
Dixit (2009) discussed how certain types of government institutions help markets
and business transactions by providing physical and organizational infrastructure, such as
property rights protection, contracts enforcement, and collective action facilitation.
Similarly, Dumludag (2009) has referred to these institutions as of economic nature and
which “determine the economic rules of the game”(p.18), and North (1990) elaborated on
the role of these institutions in creating order, reducing uncertainty in the exchange of
goods and capital, and helping to determine transaction and production costs; concluding
that institutions simply determine the feasibility and profitability of partaking any
economic activity and thus lead to more private investment.
Thus, countries establish investment promotion entities to employ promotional
techniques and carry out these objectives. Anderson and Sutherland (2015) add that such
entities are considered a useful policy tool, because they provide information and services
to foreign investors and thereby reduce the transaction cost of investing in a particular
location.
II.

Investment Promotion Agencies and FDI
IPAs are institutions through which governments carry out activities to attract FDI

inflows (Wells and Wint, 2000). These promotional activities comprise a wide range of
actions that vary from conducting investment seminars and missions for source countries,
participating in exhibitions, and engaging in advertising and marketing efforts, to
providing matching services for prospective investors with domestic partners, facilitating
the process of obtaining permits and approvals, in addition to offering services and
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consultations to committed investors, whose projects are already in operation (Wells and
Wint, 2000).
Some agencies extend their activities to grant different types of incentives to
foreign investors aiming at more FDI influxes (Lim, 2008), In contrast, Whyte et al.
(2011) stated that, there is a weak correlation between investment promotion and the
agencies responsible for performing both tasks for investment promotion and investment
regulation. This view was reinforced by Miskinis and Byrka (2014), in which they
indicated that the more an IPA is engaged in regulatory functions and activities, such as
incentives and negotiation concessions, the less efficient and successful it is in attracting
investments. Therefore, there is a wide consensus among the best practices and
evaluations (UNCTAD, 1997; Wells and Wint, 2001; Morisset and Andrews-Johnson;
2004; MIGA, 2004) on grouping the basic promotional activities and functions of IPAs
into four main core categories, ‘national image building’; ‘investment generation’;
‘investor facilitation and servicing’; and ‘policy advocacy’. Table (1) summarizes the
main activities under each of the four IPA core promotion functions.
Table (1) Core Functions of Investment Promotion






National Image Building
Disseminating information materials through several creative mediums.
Participating in investment exhibitions.
Conducting general investment missions to source countries.
Holding information seminars on investment opportunities.







Investment Generation
Targeting specific investors, sectors or firms.
Engaging in direct mail or telemarketing campaigns.
Conducting specific industry/sector based investment missions.
Holding tailored information seminars in source countries.
Involving embassies abroad in investment promotion.
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Investment Facilitation and Services
 Pre Investment Support
o Handling investment inquiries.
o Highlighting the sectoral investment opportunities.
o Providing information on investment projects.
o Providing incentives for foreign investors.
 Support in Getting Started
o Full assistance with site selection, documentation and applications.
o Providing requested information until the start of operations.
o Coordinating with the concerned authorities.
o Matchmaking service.
 Providing Aftercare Services
o Following up and monitoring an already accomplished investment project.
o Investment retention and expansion.
o Handling complaints by investors.
Policy Advocacy
 Participating in policy task forces.
 Drafting laws or policy recommendations.
 Reporting investors’ perceptions, opinions and comments.
Source: Adapted from Morisset and Andrews-Johnson (2004)

1. Structural Approaches for an Investment Promotion Agency
Beside their promotional functions, institutional structures and reporting
mechanisms of IPAs are found to be key to their efficiency (Wells and Wint, 2000;
Morisset and Andrews-Johnson, 2004; Miskinis and Byrka, 2014). Wells and Wint
(2000) have observed three different types of organization for establishing investment
promotion agencies; a government-controlled agency; a private-sector agency; or a quasigovernmental (semi-autonomous) structure. In their view, investment promotion
activities considerably vary in nature than the usual conventional government practices of
controlling, regulating, and exercising authority. They are more of marketing approaches
closer to the private sector style of business, which require flexibility, responsiveness,
and continuous communication with private sector.
Therefore, among these three structures, Wells and Wint (2000) suggest that a
semi-governmental structure is the best, because purely governmental structures would
18

lack the adequate skills required to carry out effective investment promotion activities. In
the same time, a private-sector structure would be challenged to fulfill those tasks
demanding governmental control, such as granting permits and approvals or any other
government requirements.
Accordingly, they suggest that a semi-governmental structure benefits from the
advantages of both, the purely governmental and independent private structures. In other
words, they still function under the government’s oversight by reporting to it. Yet, they
are not part of the government structure, and are not bound to its burdens and
bureaucracy when it comes to acquiring the necessary skills and expertise for handling
the promotional activities. Alongside the professional business skills, they would also
have the needed authority capabilities and direct access to government, required to
expedite the investment-servicing processes and successfully perform the IPA key
functions. Relatedly, Miskinis and Byrka considered “IPAs with quasi-government status
and private sector representation are performing better than IPAs that are incorporated as
part of a governmental body” (2014, p. 43).
Furthermore, Morisset and Andrews-Johnson (2004) have found that FDI
attraction is influenced by the way IPAs perform business and by their internal
characteristics of legal status, funding and mandates. However, for the success of any
IPA, what matters the most in these characteristics is the degree of political visibility and
private sector participation it enjoys. Both researchers have found a positive correlation
between the agency effectiveness and when the agency has a supervisory board with
representatives of private sector, and has a direct reporting relationship to a country’s
president or its prime minister.
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2. Promotional Functions and Attracting FDI
Image Building is about constructing a perception of a country as a favorable
location for investment, as well as correcting weak or negative views about the country
that could stand as an impediment against attracting FDI. Investment generation is mainly
about targeting of specific firms, investors, and sectors for a more focused investment.
Investor facilitation and servicing involves assisting investors with their businesses
during the different stages, from pre-investment support and helping them get started to
aftercare services provision. Policy advocacy includes activities through which the IPA
encourages and backs any policy changes that aim at improving the quality of the
investment climate. This function is also concerned with incorporating the views of the
private sector regarding this matter (Wells and Wint, 2000; Morisset and AndrewsJohnson, 2004; Sirr et al., 2012).
a. Image Building
Constructing a positive national image constitutes an indispensable ingredient for
investment promotion. It is the primary function of IPAs that paves the way for the
effectiveness of the other three core IPA functions. That’s why evidence suggests that
IPAs put greater emphasis in their promotional efforts on image building and investment
generation (Sirr et al., 2012; Wells &Wint, 2000). Generally, image building precedes
investment generation and uses marketing techniques to develop a favorable perception
among potential investors. Activities under image building efforts frequently include
advertising, public relations (PR) campaigns, media campaigns, participating in
investment exhibitions and investor forums, conducting investment missions maintaining
relationships with journalists and business partners, and developing the IPA’s website to

20

disseminate accurate information to the general public and prospective investors
(Morisset and Andrews-Johnson, 2004; Sirr et al., 2012).
It is suggested that countries should further invest in their national branding as
part of their image building efforts and communicate this image internally and externally.
Furthermore, investing in research about the external perceptions of the country’s
national picture is necessary to understand how foreign investors view them abroad, or
else their PR campaigns will flop (Domeisen, 2003). However, other opinions state that
determining investors’ perceptions is perplexing, especially in emerging markets, due to
many challenges, out of which political risk stand the greatest (Sirr et al., 2012).
Similarly, the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) points to
the significance of the political context and risk on investors’ perception and their choice
of investment location. It further stresses on the importance of realizing that such risks
can adversely impact FDI attraction. therefore IPAs need to pay attention and be capable
of effectively addressing these risks through image building activities (WAIPA, 2012).
b. Investment Generation
Investment Generation is another core function of IPAs. It is considered a more
directed approach to investment promotion, since it focuses on specific sectors and
countries to produce investment leads through making the IPA’s location appealing (Sirr
et al, 2012). Its activities comprise engaging in direct mail or telephone campaigns to
specific private and public firms, which are key players in the targeted sectors. Not only
can these activities be effective and cost-efficient, but also successful strategies for firm
targeting and building long-term relations (Loewendahl, 2001).
Concentrating on investment missions for specific industries or sectors is also
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vital activity for networking with a larger prospective investment community
(Loewendahl (2001). Missions require a properly made firm research based on which,
tailored presentations that tackle the needs of the targeted investors and ensure the host
country’s ability to meet these needs, will be offered (Wells and Wint, 1990). That is why
involving embassies abroad in investment generation can be effective and cost efficient.
According to Loewendahl (2001), conducting Trade missions can be another
effective and critical activity to be adopted, especially in developing countries, as they
can play an imperative role in developing strategic partnerships between local and foreign
firms, such as joint ventures, technology licensing, and outsourcing agreements. Such
inter-firm partnerships are necessary for developing countries to transfer technology and
foster the business of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Loewendahl, 2001;
Morisset and Andrews-Johnson, 2004).
Noticeably, the activities under this function fall under marketing techniques, as
in image building, however, they are more directed. One reason is that locations differ
from one country to another and so should their promotion objectives. Therefore,
marketing purposes vary from placing a location on the map, to creating a distinguished
image for a country or repositioning an existing one (Loewendahl, 2001). Another reason
that necessitates IPAs to act as investment generators is the tight budgets and funding
sources, which represent a continuous challenge to them (Sirr at al., 2012). IPAs need to
be selective and adopt the most effective activities for investment promotion, such as
sector or firm focused approach, because it has proven more effective in generating more
investments in contrast to general public relations campaigns linked with image building
(Wells and Wint, 2000).
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However, experience show that investment generation works best, when the
actual business climate in a country is better than the perceptions presumed by investors
(Loewendahl, 2001). Furthermore, IPAs can only shift their promotional efforts to
investment generation when a positive image of business climate is already existent
among potential investors (Wells and Wint, 2000).Therefore, maintaining the right
balance between both functions, and not falling in the trap of rapidly shifting to
investment generation, or staying in image-building phase longer than needed is crucial
(Sirr et al., 2012; MIGA, 2016). Moreover, the timing of the decision to move to
investment generation is also central to the IPA’s success, since it should consider several
elements, such as the existing business climate, IPA structure, adopted investment
strategy and its budget size (MIGA, 2016).
c. Investment Facilitation and Servicing
Investor Facilitation and Servicing is a major function of IPAs, since it translates
the investor’s contentment with the business climate through the operation and aftercare
stages (UNCTAD, 1997). As an investor facilitator, an IPA mediates between the host
country and the FDI source country by disseminating and communicating needed
information to prospective investors that will help them during making their investment
decisions (Lozada and Kritz, 2007; Lim, 2008). Under this function, IPAs normally
provide investment services to the investors during three stages; pre-investment support;
support in getting started; and aftercare services (Morisset and Andrews-Johnson, 2004).
Facilitation starts by offering potential investors the needed and desired
information, whether through direct contact or through the IPA website (Lozada and
Kritz, 2007). Additionally, investors are mainly concerned with the time speed,
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predictability and transparency of investment procedures, including obtaining permits and
approvals, speeding up the process of starting up a business (UNCTAD, 1997).
Therefore, the majority of IPAs provide a “one-stop shop (OSS)” to facilitate the
investment process and assist investors in getting started.
OSS is mainly created to deal with administrative hurdles that investors face,
especially in their entry stage of business, before they start operation (Morisset and
Andrews-Johnson, 2004). Thus, they provide services that range between registration,
giving approvals, expediting the obtainment of licenses and permits, coordinating with
the concerned authorities to get the needed utilities (water, electricity, etc.,), in addition to
clearances and inspections (Sader, 2000; Morisset and Andrews-Johnson, 2004).
However, Sader (2000) argues that the idealistic idea of creating a OSS, which
assumes that a single government entity will have the necessary power to give investors
the licenses, permits, approvals and clearances, proved unrealistic in many cases. He
attributes this to the enormous resistance, governments who attempt to apply an OSS
face, from the different government agencies in authority of these administrative
procedures. The OSS concept raises the concerns of many ministerial officials and
employees that it will threaten their powers and restrain their mandates. This is why
conflicts and turf battles within the governmental establishments take place (Sader,
2000).
Sader’s argument is consistent with the view of Loewendahl (2001), who stressed
that a successful IPA does not only depend on its professionalism, for an effective
facilitation process, but depends greatly on its strong linkage with the governmental
institutions. This is especially true in developing countries, as many necessary activities,
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required to ease the investors’ business entry are highly reliant on the synergy between
the IPA and the different government ministries and agencies.
Aftercare services come in a later stage, post setting up a business, where the IPA
offers a range of activities with the aim of supporting re-investments and expansions,
generating new investments, and lastly retaining and upgrading the ongoing projects
(Loewendahl, 2001; UNCTAD, 2007). According to Young and Hood (1994) aftercare
services programs have the advantage and capability of extending long-term economic
impact to the host country.
Aftercare services encompass monitoring and offering continuous consultations to
existent investment businesses to facilitate any hurdles and solve any bottlenecks (Lozada
and Kritz, 2007). In addition to the fact, that these activities are key to encourage existing
investors to take re-investment and expansion decisions, they also lead to attracting new
investments. Following up with investors makes them content and consequently they
become your best ambassadors to other prospective investors and will encourage them to
think positively of a country as an investment location (UNCTAD, 1997; Loewendahl,
2001). Most importantly, the UNCTAD (2007) indicated that, “the cost of winning
investments through aftercare is less than that of generating investments from new
companies” (p. 51).That explains why Lim (2008) pointed to the growing importance of
aftercare services to any country seeking FDI.
Retaining and upgrading the ongoing projects is another aim of providing
aftercare services, given its fundamental role in achieving stronger linkage with local
businesses and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which in turn leads to higher
economic impact (UNCTAD, 2007). When aftercare services links local companies with
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the existing foreign businesses in the country, they simply integrate the local SMEs into
the global economy and thus have a positive long-term spillover effect on the hostcountry economy (OECD, 2011). This can be conducted through providing the adequate
policy environment that encourages creating this business linkage to ensure transferring
know-know and technology from the foreign firms to local SMEs through provision of
trainings and technical support to local personnel (OECD, 2011).
Moreover, the success and effectiveness of aftercare services is the same like the
OSS; both are highly dependent on the collaboration between the IPA and other
governmental agencies, where a partnership approach is crucial (UNCTAD, 2007).
d. Policy Advocacy
The fourth and final function of investment promotion is Policy Advocacy, which
refers to activities that advocate for a better quality of the investment climate (Wells and
Wint, 2000). Morrisset and Andrews Johnson (2004) have identified policy advocacy as
the function most correlated with FDI inflows, and OECD (2014) considered it one of the
main measures to evaluate the success of any IPA. Despite this fact, yet professionals and
experts of the developed world undervalue this function when they offer their assistance
and guidance to IPAs in developing countries, since they haven’t experienced its
necessity in their countries (Morrisset and Andrews Johnson, 2004).
The importance of policy advocacy stems from the pivotal and practical role its
activities play, in formulating the investment policy, identifying the existing problems
and bottlenecks in all laws related to investment, and lobbying and offering proposals to
improve the business climate of the country (Morrisset and Andrews Johnson, 2004;
OECD, 2014). Furthermore, policy advocacy contributes to enhancing the overall
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business conditions for domestic investment, because as Morriset and Andrews Johnson
(2004) indicate, “what is good for foreign investment, in terms of investment climate, is
equally good for the local investor” (p. 37).
III.

Importance of Investment Legislations
Attracting foreign capital needs an adequate favorable investment climate in host

countries, where the State’s legal mechanism, providing incentives and guarantees to
foreign investors, compromises its founding cornerstone (Nilov, 2011). Moreover,
according to Casey (2013), the capacity of investment promotion activities to draw more
FDI is highly reliant on the existing regulatory environment, which is rather rewarding
than punishing to businesses. In brief, clear laws and regulations are the pillars of any
investment framework for several reasons. First, in the absence of a strong legal
framework, the organizational position of an IPA may possibly become unclear and may
in turn lead to duplication and overlapping of mandates with other involved actors
(OECD, 2015). Second, investment by nature is futuristic and anticipative, and that is
why transparency, predictability and credibility of policies, laws and procedures are
principal considerations to any investor (UNCTAD, 1997; OECD, 2015).
An effective legislative framework encourages and provides investors with the
needed level of confidence required to make them enter the host country and engage into
business transactions there. In this context, Casey (2013) indicated two main pitfalls that
must be evaded in order to generate a pro-FDI framework. First is the conception and
actuality that laws and regulations favor domestic companies over foreign ones. Second,
the perception and reality that court in host countries are not neutral or impartial. In other
words, host countries should cling to a “non-discriminating” principle with regards to

27

foreign investors. Sun (2002) suggests that discrimination may take place in two forms
“either by favoring the interests of host nationals over those of foreigners or by favoring
the interests of foreigners of certain nations over foreigners of other nations” (p.5). That
is to say, assurance that laws do not discriminate against or between foreign investors is a
decisive aspect in shaping a positive investment climate that is further attractive, enabling
and supportive to investors and private sector.
Investment regulations must also define clear set of procedures with regard to
business entry, operation and exit. This is considered another area, where investment law
can serve both domestic and foreign investors and reflect a favorable investment climate
in a host country (OECD, 2008). Procedures commonly include screening, approving,
registering, licensing, and monitoring businesses, however they vary in the number and
completion time, across different countries (Loewendahl, 2001; Sun, 2002; Sader, 2003).
Empirical evidence shows that the longer and more complicated administrative
procedures are, the higher administrative and regulatory costs incurred, which in turn is
associated with lower FDI inflows (Djankov, 2002; Sun; 2002; Torriti and Ikpe, 2015).
Therefore, an effective legislative framework should reduce barriers to investment by
stipulating on fixed procedures and approval mechanisms that simply shorten the
timeframe and procedural steps applied.
Moreover, Sun (2002) has pointed to fact that, although regulatory procedures are
essential and useful for creating an appealing investment climate, yet how these
procedures are being carried out makes all the difference. Therefore, the competency of
supporting institutions is considered fundamental in any effective regulatory framework
for attracting FDI. Accordingly, Sun indicated that for an IPA to be effective, it should
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have a solid legal base that clearly outlines its mandate, authority, and powers.
Furthermore, it “should define its functions and responsibilities, external structure
including linkages with the government and the private sector, the composition and
selection process of its board, staffing and reporting arrangements, and how it is to be
funded” (p.15).
IV.

Effectiveness of Investment Promotion Agencies
The effectiveness of IPAs to attract more FDI has been investigated in many

researches. The most important studies and their findings are featured in this literature
review because of their rigorousness and ability to respond to different hypothesis.
Morisset and Andrews-Johnson (2004) examined the IPA effectiveness in 58
countries, in terms of the association between their promotional spending and FDI
inflows. The cross-country variations in FDI flows found were owed to IPAs, only when
the promotion effort is measured by the IPA budget. When the research was extended
beyond only the amount of resources spent by the agency, to explore how the allocation
of these resources across the IPA functions may be significant, policy advocacy appeared
to be the most associated with cross-country variation in FDI inflows, followed by image
building, investor services, and lastly investment generation (Morisset and AndrewsJohnson, 2004).
In a second study that depended on data collected through a worldwide census of
Investment Promotion Agencies, Harding and Javorcik (2011) used information on
investment promotion efforts from 124 countries, out of which 75% were developing
countries. Harding and Javorcik discussed two arguments: The first is that investment
promotion may be a cost-effective way to raise FDI influxes, mainly in developing
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countries, where information about business conditions is not available and bureaucratic
procedures are acute. The second argument relates to IPAs engaged in sector targeting
and whether they receive more investment in the post- targeting period, relative to the
pre-targeting period and non-targeted sectors.
Regression modeling was used to test both hypotheses and proved that investment
promotion efforts are more successful in developing rather than developed countries,
where red tape and information irregularities are likely to be grave. Moreover, IPAs in
countries suffering from high corruption, scarcity of information, and bureaucratic long
procedures to start a business are more effective, since they reduce macroeconomic
uncertainty by providing information, and assisting investors with complicated
administrative procedures (Harding and Javorcik, 2011). The study regressions further
showed that IPAs are likely to be of higher importance and significance in assisting with
red tape more than in information provision. Likewise, for the second hypothesis, the
empirical results indicated that IPAs engaged in targeting specific sectors, attract and
receive more than twice as much FDI as non-targeted sectors in developing countries.
Similarly, Charlton and Davis (2007) tested the effectiveness of investment
promotion by examining the successfulness of IPAs in attracting more FDI at the industry
level. The study used industry level data from 22 OECD countries on FDI inflows in 19
different industries. Results showed that the industry targeting implemented by IPAs led
to a 41 percent increase of FDI inflows into that industry.
These studies used different strategies to deal with the potential reverse causality
problem and distinguish the effect of an IPA from other changes in policies or anything
else relevant for FDI inflows occurring at the same time. However, as clearly evident
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from the review of literature and the summary of studies featured in Table (2), most
studies applied quantitative methods in assessing the performance of IPAs. Yet the
dynamics of private investment, including the implementation feasibility that changes by
the differences in circumstances, institutional capacities and contextual factors across
countries, remain under captured. This presents a gap in the literature that this research
will tackle by using a qualitative design that will facilitate explaining the contextual
factors influencing the potential of IPAs to effectively attract and promote investments.
Table (2) Summary of Major Studies on IPAs Effectiveness

Study and
Author
Wells and Wint
(1990)

Methodologies and Samples
Used

Findings
 Positive relationship between IPAs
and FDI influxes.

Regression analysis
50 country cases

Loewendahl
(2001)

Morisset and
AndrewsJohnson (2004)

Charlton and
Davis (2007)

Harding and
Javorcik (2011)

 Aftercare activities should be given
more attention among the investment
promotion activities, in order to
maximize the long-term benefits
from inflowing FDI.

No empirical test was used

Regression analysis that used IPA  Positive relationship between IPA’s
budget, IPA staff, and control
promotional budget and FDI influxes.
variables.
 Policy advocacy is the most
58 country cases
associated with FDI inflows,
followed by image building, investor
services, and lastly investment
generation.
Statistical techniques (propensity  Investment generation and sector
score matching and the differencetargeting attract more FDI than
in-differences specification)
general promotion.
Cases of 19 industries from 22  Sector targeting led to a 41%
OECD countries
increase in the growth rate of FDI
inflows in the specified sectors.
Regression analysis that used  Investment promotion efforts are
proxies to capture the availability
more successful in countries with red
of information about the host
tape and information irregularities.
country and the heavy bureaucratic
 IPAs are of higher significance in
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procedures they have.

assisting with red tape more than in
information provision.

124 country cases
 IPAs engaged in targeting specific
sectors, attract and receive more than
twice as much FDI as non-targeted
sectors in developing countries.
Source: Author Constructed
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Chapter Three:
Literature Review on Investment in Egypt and Evolution of GAFI
This chapter offers an overview on the general investment environment in Egypt,
by presenting a quantitative picture of the FDI figures and the country’s rank in
international reports with respect to many priority issues for investors, along with
reviewing the developments and reforms that have been carried out by the government to
improve the overall business climate. In the second part, the researcher will go over
different investment legislative frameworks in order to review the history of GAFI from
its inception and discuss the development of its role and powers until our present day. It
will conclude by tackling GAFI’s current mandate. This overview lays a proper ground
for understanding the new investment law in force, and therefore analyzing how the
current institutional and legislative frameworks impact the way GAFI operates.
I.

Overview on the Investment Environment in Egypt

Given the importance of investments to the country’s economic growth, Egypt has
been among those developing countries competing to attract FDI by adopting different
strategies to attract foreign investors, such as liberalizing trade, granting incentives,
facilitating business entry, and establishing free and special economic zones. In this
regard, the Egyptian investment environment has witnessed several legislative and
institutional reforms that considerably impacted the level of FDI inflows and similarly the
level of domestic investments.
A significant increase in FDI inflows can be witnessed by taking a look at their
levels during the past two decades, especially during the period between 2006 and 2008
(Figure 2), which in turn contributed to the revival of the Egyptian economy. The FDI
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inflow has risen from US$2 billion in 2004 to US$13.2 billion in 2008 (MoI, 2015). This
upturn can be attributed to the government’s efforts during this period to simplify and
streamline investment procedures, eliminate bureaucratic hurdles, in addition, privatize
several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public-sector banks that took place between
1991 and 2008, under the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program
(ERSAP) (Masry, 2015).
Figure (2) Net Foreign Direct Investment in Egypt
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However, it can be noted from Figure (2) that FDI inflows started to decline in
2009, reaching its lowest point in 2011 due to the 25th of January Revolution and its
ramifications. The political instability that followed was accompanied by an elevation in
policy uncertainty, labor strikes in public and private sectors, a rise in the unemployment
rate, reluctance from the government officials to make strong decisions, in addition to an
occurrence of a serious energy crisis. Furthermore, investor disputes increased after court
decisions to nullify seven sale and privatization contract agreements of state entities to
foreign investors. All of these predicaments have negatively and enormously affected the
country’s overall business climate, harmed many economic sectors and pushed investors
away from operating in Egypt.
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As a result, there was an urgent need to revive private investments and hence the
Egyptian government began to revise all investment policies and practices, consider
institutions’ effectiveness, and reform laws to regain the investors’ confidence. With the
advent of a new President, great attention was directed towards investment, to support the
country and overcome its exacerbated economic situation. The government held the
Egypt Economic Development Conference (EEDC) in March 2015 with political support
from different countries, especially the Gulf ones, and international institutions such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group. These efforts mark
Egypt’s eagerness on improving the investment climate and restoring economic growth.
In a competitive international environment, attracting more FDI is challenging
and requires the presence of competent national institutions with an integrated structure
that fits the contemporary world affairs. Furthermore, it requires a realistic realization of
where the country stands, with respect to issues of high priority to investment attraction.
In 2016, Egypt’s rank in the World Bank Doing Business Reports (Tables 3 and 4),
dropped to 131 out of 188 countries in 2016 compared to 94 out of 183 countries in 2011,
with regards to the ease of doing business. Moreover, Egypt’s rank in 2015 continued to
deteriorate in the Global Competitiveness Reports of the World Economic Forum, since
2011 Revolution, where a significant decline was observed in the “Macroeconomic
Environment” and “Institutions” pillars (WEF, 2015).
Table (3): Egypt's Ranks in Doing Business Reports

Ease of Doing Business
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

94 of 183

110 of 183

109 of 185

128 of 189

126 of 189

131 of 189

Source: Doing Business Report Series, 2011-2016
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Table (4): Ease of Doing Business ranks
Indicators

Starting a Business
Dealing with Construction Permits
Getting Electricity
Registering Property
Getting Credit
Protecting Minority Investors
Paying Taxes
Trading Across Borders
Enforcing Contracts
Resolving Insolvency
Source: Doing Business Report Series

2016

73
113
144
111
79
122
151
157
155
119

2015

69
114
145
109
71
133
146
157
155
121

2011

18
154
93
72
74
136
21
143
131

Change in ranks
from 2015 and 2016

-4
+1
+1
-2
-8
+11
-5
No change
No change
+2

Several concerns remain unappealing to investors and problematic for a healthy
investment climate. On top of these concerns come the policy instability and the
inefficient government bureaucracy as the two most problematic factors for doing
business in Egypt, according to the Doing Business report of 2016. Also, with respect to
the protection of “Property Rights”, whether real or intellectual, Egypt’s score in the
International Property Rights Index has dropped for the fourth consecutive year (Figure
3), marking 4.1 for 2015 in comparison to 4.6 in 2014 (IPRI, 2015). According to the
World Bank Doing Business report (2016), an investor in Egypt is required to deal with 8
procedures that demand 63 days to register a real property at a cost of 0.6% of the
property’s value. The overall country rank of 111 out of 189, with respect to ease of
registering property, shows how Egypt lags behind countries’ averages as for the number
of procedures and days required to register a property. Likewise, the status of
“Intellectual Property Rights” (IPR) is weak despite the fact that Egypt has a law1 for
protecting the intellectual property rights, and the stipulation of the new 2014

1Law No.

82 for 2002
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Constitution on the state’s commitment to the protection of IPR in Article 692. However,
IPRI (2015) reports that Egypt’s position is 83 out of 129 globally, and 10 out of 20
regionally with respect to intellectual property (Table 5).
Figure (3): IPRI Overall Index
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Table (5): IPRI Scores for Egypt in 2015
Score
Globally
4.1
102 of 129
3.6
94 of 129
4.5
115 of 129
4.3
83 of 129

Regionally
14 of 20
16 of 20
20 of 20
10 of 20

Corruption is another important area that needs to be tackled in Egypt. Several
studies have proved its negative association with a country’s capital inflows, and hence a
liability to the host economy (Della Porta and Vanucci, 1999; Zurawicki and Habib,
2010). Ketkar et al. (2005) have found that a one-point increase in CPI would attract an
average additional FDI of 0.5% of GDP in developing countries. In addition, a “three
point improvement in CPI would more than double the corporate tax take on average”
(p.1) in Egypt. Furthermore, Handoussa and Louis (2003) indicated that corruption in
Egypt is related to institutional framework, specifically with regulating the entry of
2Article

69: The state shall protect all types of intellectual property in all fields, and shall establish a
specialized body to uphold the rights of Egyptians and their legal protection, as regulated by law.
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foreign investors. Moreover, corruption has become a worrisome concern for prospective
investors following the 2011 Revolution, after the cases that have been brought against
private companies, nullifying the privatization deals of seven SOEs, owing to corruption
and faulty contracts. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
which classify countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be,
ranked Egypt 88 out of 168 in 2015 (Transparency International, 2015).
Other matters like competition from SOEs, investment dispute settlement, and the
existence of a bankruptcy law greatly contribute to shaping a supportive environment for
nurturing investments, where competent institutions can play a significant role. This takes
us to the next part unfolding GAFI and its development over time.
II.

Investment Frameworks in Egypt and Evolution of GAFI throughout
Legislations

In order to understand the current context within which GAFI operates, its role,
scope of work, and limit of powers, it is imperative to give a brief background on its
inception and how its role developed over years. Therefore, this section provides a brief
summary on GAFI and how it was initiated and developed overtime. It sheds light on
important stops that are remarked in the age of the agency, tackles its current mandates,
and emphasizes the focal policies and laws enacted in Egypt.
a. GAFI’s Inception
The first investment law in Egypt was promulgated by President Mohamed
Anwar el Sadat in 1971. Since that date, Egypt has been witnessing a succession of
investment laws over the past 45 years. Law 65/1971 aimed at attracting foreign
investments through offering many incentives that included the establishment of free
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zones and guarantees against nationalization actions by the government. Nevertheless, it
attracted very few investments due to the sensitivity of the period and the ramifications of
the 1967 War that followed (Farah, 2009). Three years later, in 1974, President Sadat
introduced the Open Door Policy, allowing foreign investments in the country after long
decades of prohibition. Like law 65/1971, Law 43/1974 for Arab and Foreign Funds and
the Free Zones, aimed at opening the door to Arab and foreign capitals through offering
privileges and legal protection. To facilitate the process of foreign investment, the Law
stipulated the establishment of the General Authority for Arab and Foreign Investment
and Free Zones, to work under the auspices of the Prime Minister and be the responsible
body for administering the law. Responsibilities charged to the Authority included
identifying appropriate projects for investment, contacting investors and assessing their
proposed projects, facilitating the process of investment, operation, and obtaining the
necessary permits and administrative approvals, studying Egypt's investment laws and
regulations and offering the appropriate recommendations for improving the foreign
investment code, approving the profit repatriation process, in addition to managing the
free Zones.
The law identified nine specific areas for foreign and Arab investments and relied
on offering incentives and guarantees, some of which the Authority was granted the right
to offer. These incentives and guarantees included an assurance to refrain from
nationalization and confiscation of investment projects or its capital; tax exemption from
5 to 8 years and from 10 to 15 years for projects of reconstruction and establishment of
new cities; deferment on paying customs duties; duty-free imports of equipment,
machinery, and material considered "necessary" for projects establishment and operation.
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Law 43/1974 was amended several times, until replaced by Law 230/1989, which was in
turn replaced by another law in 1997.
b. Reinventing GAFI: from a regulator to a facilitator
In 1997, under the ruling of President Mubarak, the Guarantees and Investment
Incentives Law No. 8/1997 was issued and stayed in force until 2015. The law aimed at
encouraging domestic and foreign investments in targeted economic sectors and
promoting incentives for industry to relocate it away from the crowded Nile Valley area
(Stone, 2009). The law identified specific areas for investment and regulated companies,
which work in these areas irrespective to their legal form. Specified investment areas
included agricultural, poultry and animal production, industry and mining, oil services
relating to digging and exploration, hotels and tourism, sea transport, housing and
infrastructure, computer software and high-tech products, medical facilities, some
financial services firms, projects funded by the Social Development Fund.
The law also abolished the old GAFI and stipulated on replacing it by a new
entity, to be the sole authority responsible to guide the investors, whether domestic or
foreign, and which is designated to establish their companies. Similar to Law 43/1997,
this law relied again on offering guarantees and incentives to attract investments. It
grouped around 20 incentives and exemptions under one law; precisely tax exemptions in
the mentioned specific fields, however the legislator took the spatial scale – the location
where investment activities will be carried – as the basis for determining the exemption
duration to lie between five and twenty-year tax exemptions accordingly. Incentives and
guarantees entailed allowing a full foreign ownership of ventures; providing the right to
own land and to maintain foreign currency bank accounts; guaranteeing the right to
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repatriate capital and profits; and stipulating on equal treatment regardless of nationality.
It is important to refer to other important decrees and laws that impacted GAFI’s
powers and authority. On one hand, in 2002, two decrees were issued; Presidential
Decree No. 79/2002 to establish OSS under GAFI; and Prime Minister’s Decree No.
636/2002 to organize the work of the OSS. The main aim was to override bureaucracy
and facilitate procedures for investors, through providing all the necessary investment
related services at one place, and bringing together officials from the relevant
government entities to offer approvals, permits and licenses without obliging investors to
refer to other higher authorities.
On the other hand, Law 13/2004, amending Law 8/1997 was issued to consolidate
GAFI and the Companies’ Authority into one single entity responsible for establishing all
new companies. This new law also unified many legal procedures necessary for
registration. It further empowered GAFI to give temporary licenses for project
establishment, and to act on behalf of investors and government bodies throughout the
life cycle of a project. All of these legislations along with other important factors at that
time, as the strong political support, enabled GAFI to shift its role from a regulator to a
promoter and from a prevalent culture of bureaucracy accustomed to regulating the
private sector to another more accustomed to assisting it.
Another important stop to note is the issuance of the Unified Corporate and
Income Tax Law No. 91 of 2005 by the Egyptian Cabinet. This law ended the tax
exemptions that were previously stipulated on, in the Investment Law, and instead
compensated them by decreasing the rate of Corporate Tax from 42% to only 20%.
Hence, investors were left to establish their businesses under either law; the Investment
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or the Companies Law, since both had the same incentives and guarantees. In either case,
GAFI maintained the status of the official governmental regulator, responsible for
reviewing and approving projects. This decision was pursuant to the conviction that tax
exemptions do not represent a real incentive to serious investors. Also, it was viewed in
favor of the Egyptian economy because it aims at rectifying the perceived injustices of
the Investment Law and controlling the rampant administrative corruption and tax fraud.
Table (6) summarizes the most important investment laws and amendments with respect
to their effect over GAFI and its powers.
Table (6) Laws and GAFI powers
Law Number

Features and Powers Granted to GAFI
 Opened the door to Arab and foreign capitals through offering privileges and legal
protection
 Established the General Authority for Arab and Foreign Investment and Free Zones.

Arab and Foreign
Capital Investment Law
43/1974

 GAFI is responsible for screening and approving foreign investment projects
 GAFI suggests and approves incentives upon a presidential decree
 GAFI shall issue the required permits and licenses
 GAFI’s role was a regulator.

Investment
Incentives Law
8/1997 and its
amendments and
related decrees.
 Presidential Decree
284/1997 to establish
GAFI

 Stipulated on equal treatment regardless of nationality
 Replaced old GAFI with a new one by a presidential decree.
 Changed GAFI’s governance to encompass three vice-chairmen, a Board of
Directors, and a Board of Trustees.
 GAFI may establish offices inside or outside Egypt


 Presidential Decree
79/2002 to establish OSS

 Prime Minister’s decree
636/2002 organized the
work of the OSS

Established One-Stop-Shop under GAFI.
GAFI is the sole body responsible for investors’ incentives and guarantees (tax
advantages, reduced tariffs for imported inputs, and guarantees against
confiscation).
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 Law 13/2004 (added
articles 47-70)
 Presidential Decree
316/2004

 GAFI is mandated to assist investors in site selection and land acquisition for their
projects
 GAFI serves as a One-Stop-Shop to facilitate and simplify procedures of obtaining
licenses, approvals and registration of new companies, however it was only
functional in the phase of establishing firms (started in Jan 2005).
 Empowered GAFI to give temporary licenses for project establishment, and to act
on behalf of investors and government bodies throughout the life cycle of a project.
 Formed a dispute settlement committee in GAFI to manage any problems between
investors and any administrative bodies
 Shifted GAFI’s role towards an investment facilitator and promoter.
 Abolished the tax holidays, previously provided by Law 8/1997.

Income Tax Law
91/2005

 Lowered the income tax rate by 50 per cent by introducing a flat corporate tax of
20% (instead of 42%) to compensate for the abolition of the tax holidays.

Source: Author Constructed

c. Current Mandates of GAFI
The current mandates of GAFI according to its original founding decree and the recent
Investment Law No. 17/20153, include the responsibility of (1) attracting, developing,
and promoting investments at the foreign and domestic levels 4 , (2) providing all the
required investment services through acting as a one-stop shop, to assist investors and
grant them necessary approvals, permits, and licenses to start up and operate a business in
Egypt. It is also entrusted with the task of unifying the entire set of official application
forms and templates in coordination with the competent authorities, and providing those
forms and templates for electronic use. In addition, it is in charge of (3) regulating and
managing the investment zones and the free zones, whether public5 or private, where it is

3

Articles 85 and 86 in Law No. 17/2015
This mandate shall be carried out by a newly established ‘National Center’- Details in Chapter 6
5 There are currently 10 public free zones in operation in the following locations: Alexandria, Damietta,
East Port Said Port Zone, Ismalia, Qeft, Media Production City, Nasr City, Port Said, Shebin El Kom, and
Suez.
4
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authorized to grant firms that are not physically located in free zones the status of
“private free zones” to enjoy its special benefits. GAFI also holds the responsibility of (4)
stimulating entrepreneurship and SME investments by providing financial and know-how
support through its “Bedaya Center for Entrepreneurship and SME Development”, which
was established in 2010.Moreover, GAFI provides other services like (5) settling disputes
through the “Investors' Dispute Settlement Center” established in 2009, to settle through
mediation any disputes that may arise between investors and among shareholders of
foreign invested companies. This service is also provided online, where investors can
have access to decisions made by the Dispute Settlement Committee and the date of the
decision. However, it is only available in Arabic.
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Chapter Four:
Conceptual Framework
This chapter presents the conceptual framework adopted in this thesis. It frames
and perceives the different concepts that directly affect the process of investment
promotion. It should be noted that this research focuses only on the promotion mandate
of the IPA, excluding any other additional ones. The concepts identified in this
conceptual framework are derived from the literature review to help the researcher
precisely answer the research questions.
The conceptual framework has three facets. The first focuses on conceptualizing
the “investment promotion agency”, being an executive arm for the government to
enhance the situation of private investment. The second facet concentrates on the
elements that define the effectiveness of an IPA. The third facet delineates the legislative
framework, which directly affects the process of investment promotion and the IPA.
I.

Investment Promotion Agency (IPA)
Investment promotion is a process of attracting foreign and domestic investments

with the aim of contributing to the economic growth and development of a country.
Hence, investment promotion agency is intrinsic for facilitating this process.
As identified in the literature, by the most studies and best practices, this research
perceives investment promotion agency as the institutionalization of a country’s
dedication and determination to attract FDI, through performing the four main
promotional activities; precisely ‘image building’; ‘investment generation’; ‘investor
facilitation and servicing’; and ‘policy advocacy’. Moreover, the study further views the
IPA as the government’s executive arm, in charge of interpreting the goals and objectives
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of the country’s national investment strategy into actual results, and therefore analyzes
the extent to which an interventionist approach is contributing to attracting private
investment in Egypt.
II.

Effectiveness of Institutional Structure of IPAs
The research conceives the institutional structure as a manifestation of the

potential of the IPA, which further determines its internal and external strengths. The
effectiveness of this institutional structure relies on elements related to both
organizational characteristics and its performed functions. Hence, each of these elements
is detailed and defined as follows:
a. Organizational Elements
1. Legal status
The legal status element of the IPA portrays its basic legal features that can be
depicted in the mode of creation; whether the IPA is created by a decree or a law and its
institutional form; whether the IPA is purely governmental or quasi-governmental or
private. Both represent the legal foundation for an IPA, which directly influence its
mandate and powers, and in turn affect its capacity to attract FDI. The legal status also is
concerned with the nature of mandates given to the IPA.
2. IPA’s Relationship with the Government
This element tackles the existing relationship between the IPA and its respective
ministry, in addition to its relationship with other governmental ministries and agencies.
First, it highlights the IPA positioning within the political system, which can be
inferred from the degree of autonomy in which the IPA enjoys, as well as its reporting
mechanism.
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Second, it encompasses the political context within which the IPA operates and
may influence its capacity for effective performance, which mainly depends on the IPA
positioning within the political system. It focuses on the intra-governmental relations and
coordination mechanisms that are usually shaped by the power dynamics between the
IPA and these different ministries, and agencies.
3. IPA’s Relationship with private sector
This element involves the linkage and level of cooperation between the IPA and
the private sector. It focuses on the representation of private sector in the governance of
the IPA, their involvement in the functioning of the IPA and the IPA’s linkage to other
business communities.
4. IPA’s Resources
This element involves both the financial and human resources pertaining to the
promotional mandate. Hence, the research only focuses on those resources in the
promotion division in the IPA.
Human resources focus on the number of staff dedicated to promotion in the IPA
and their qualification level. The financial resources concentrate on size of budget
allocated to promotion.
b. Functional Elements
1. Image building
This element is meant to portray a country as a favorable and credible place for
foreign investments. It focuses on the strategy and tools used to build an image of a
country within the investment community as an appealing location for attracting future
investments.
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2. Investment generation
Investment generation element looks at the extent to which the IPA successfully
prioritizes specific sectors or industries, with a view of creating investment leads. It
focuses on the presence of a targeting strategy and its linkage with the country’s overall
economic vision.
3. Investors servicing and facilitation
This element refers to the range of services provided by the IPA that can assist an
investor in analyzing investment decisions, establishing a business, and maintaining it in
good standing.
4. Policy advocacy
This element looks at an IPA as an investment promotion tool by being part of the
broader policy process regarding investment. It identifies the agency’s activities aimed at
improving the quality of the investment climate through lobbying for reforming
investment policies and laws.
III.

Legislative Framework
Creating an appropriate legal framework for investment is one of the fundamental

elements for improving the investment environment. On one side, it enhances the stability
of transactions, and on the other side, it raises the degree of confidence in the strength of
the economic system as a whole. This legal framework should offer investors with
sufficient protection measures and guarantee the facilitation of procedures, which would
therefore encourage accumulating capital, lower transaction costs and contribute to
giving investors a sense of real stability; all of which are needed for long-term
investments.
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This research perceives the legal framework as the laws and regulations that
govern the IPA and enable its operations with regards to performing its promotional and
facilitation role. The legislative framework sets the legal guarantees provided to investors
and the different incentives used for attracting FDI. It further determines if the IPA has
the required adequate control to assist investors in establishing and maintaining their
businesses.
The relationship between the concepts provided in the conceptual framework is
presented in the conceptual map in figure (4).
It can be noticed that the four organizational elements affect each other. Also they
strongly affect the functional elements. For instance, on one hand, the mode of creation in
the legal status determines the political positioning of the IPA in the government, since it
either protects it from or exposes it to disruptive amendments that occur usually with
government reshuffles. Therefore, it contributes to the IPA stability, which is key in
maintaining its political relations with other governmental agencies and positioning itself
as a mediator between them and the different investment opportunities. On the other
hand, if the institutional form is purely governmental, this would affect the quality and
culture of performing the promotional and facilitation roles.
Furthermore, the relationship with the government directly affects the quality of
services provided to the investors, especially when it comes to land allocation and
licenses. Also, the fact that the IPA is well positioned in the government and maintains
high quality political relations with other ministries and agencies empowers the IPA to
play a more effective advocacy role.
The relationship with the private sector sturdily affects the investors’ perceptions
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about the IPA, since it enables the IPA to identify and understand the obstacles of
investment from the investors’ perspective, which would in turn empower the IPA to play
a tougher role in policy advocacy supported by the private sector. It also contributes in
fostering a business like culture, away from rigid bureaucratic nature of governmental
institutions.
Moreover, the human and financial resources are greatly affected by the degree of
IPA linkage to the private sector. For example, the private sector could offer funds to IPA
budget, and hence contribute to maintaining adequate financial resources, which will in
turn allow for attracting qualified skilled caliber to the IPA. This will positively affect
carrying out the promotional functions.
Also, the functional elements affect each other. For example, focusing on
investors servicing and policy advocacy functions directly influence the image building.
In addition, prioritizing efforts towards the country’s “image building” lead to investment
generation.
Hence, both organizational and functional elements determine the extent to which
the institutional structure of the IPA is effective. Furthermore, the legislative framework
in which the IPA operates directly influences the IPA and the effectiveness of its
institutional structure.
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Figure (4): Conceptual Map
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Chapter Five:
Methodology
This chapter describes the methodology used in this research. The first section
details the approach used, followed by a second section that outlines the data sources,
sample design and data analysis techniques.
I.

Methodology
In order to understand the extent to which GAFI is enabled to fulfill its mandate

as the national agency in Egypt responsible for investment promotion, a qualitative
methodological approach of a single case study analysis is applied. The selection of the
case study is based on the fact that GAFI is the only IPA in Egypt, and is considered the
executive arm of the Ministry of Investment (MoI), responsible for executing the MoI
strategy in promoting and facilitating investments.
As for the limitations of the study, although the research increases the scope of
knowledge about IPAs in general and provides a more clear understanding of the
dynamics of investment promotion in Egypt in particular, its findings are only country
limited and cannot be generalized to other IPAs worldwide, due to the methodological
limitation inherent in the case study approach. The resistance of interviewees to disclose
information about the budget allocated for promotion and their financial operations with
regards to its different activities was another study limitation.

II.

Data Collection
The research depends on both desk research and primary data. The desk research

is gathered through a dynamic and critical reading of the existing investment laws, in
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addition to reviewing other relevant laws, executive regulations, decrees, governmental
documents, books, and literature in the form of national and international reports and
studies. Whereas, collecting primary data was through conducting a number of in-depth,
semi-structured interviews with a purposeful sample.
III.

Sample Design
This research uses a purposive sample of nineteen interviewees. Interviews were

conducted during 2016 between the period of 30 May and 3 August 2016. Each interview
took between one to three hours, and the identity of the interviewees remains anonymous.
The sample included current and former officials in GAFI, Ministry of Investment,
Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform (MoPMAR), in addition to
affiliates to the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The following part encompasses the
rationale behind selecting each of these units for analysis.
a.

The General Authority For Investment and Free Zones
GAFI is the main unit of analysis and the case study of this research. The sample

includes interviews one of GAFI’s current Senior Management, which comprises of a
CEO and 2 deputies, former chairmen, board members from private sectors, and senior
officials from different functional departments inside GAFI. Interviews were conducted
to provide the researcher with a clear understanding to the agency’s main functions,
especially those related to image building, investment generation, policy advocacy and
services provided to investors at different stages. It further helped explore the intragovernmental relationship between GAFI and other concerned ministries and authorities,
in addition to the degree of influence the private sector has on the decisions taken inside
the agency. Moreover, it allowed the researcher to investigate the effect of the new
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investment law on GAFI’s functions and operation. Therefore, 14 interviews were
conducted with:


GAFI’s Management Official



Two Board Members



Two Senior Promotion Officials



Senior OSS Official



Senior Policies Official



Senior Dispute Settlement Official



Five Functional Officers



Researcher in the Management Office

b.

Ministry of Investment

Interviews were aimed at examining the relationship between GAFI and MoI,
how this relationship affects the private investment, the perception of MoI towards GAFI
in light of the new law, and how MoI supports GAFI. Hence, two interviews were
conducted with:

c.



Senior Official at the Ministry of Investment



Current Assistant to Minister of Investment
Other Ministries and Agencies

Interviews were conducted with government officials from the MoPMAR, and
affiliates of the Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade, namely the Industrial
Development Agency (IDA), and the Industry Modernization Center (IMC), to cross
check whether the new law gives the right mandates to GAFI, and to further examine the
relationship and level of cooperation between GAFI and these ministries and shed light
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on how these relationships affect private investment in Egypt. Three interviews were
conducted with


Senior Official at MoPMAR

MoPMAR coordinated with GAFI in promoting for investment opportunities
during the EEDC and is the responsible ministry for preparing the investment chapter in
the State budget. In addition, the selected official also served as Former Principle Deputy
Minister at MoI, therefore he was included in the sample to explore the dynamics of
issuing Law17/2015 at MoI. His two titles will be used simultaneously in the research.


Former Chairman of IDA.

IDA is considered one of the powerful agencies and main players in facilitating
investments, since it is considered an authority with jurisdiction over lands and also
grants industrial licenses. Therefore it is a decisive agency with regards to obtaining
licenses from the OSS.


Senior Official at IMC.

IMC is supposed to work with GAFI on promoting some industries and offering
services to the investors.
IV.

Data Analysis
The primary data collected through the semi-structured interviews was

thematically analyzed based on specific elements that are provided in the conceptual
framework. Other secondary data obtained from investment laws and executive
regulations were critically analyzed. Data triangulation is used in this research by
obtaining the data from interviews with former and current different hierarchal levels
inside GAFI and other governmental ministries and agencies. Using data triangulation
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allowed for cross- checking and validating the findings of this research. Based on
thematic analysis, the data emerged from both primary data and desk research was
synthesized together to provide clear and deep understanding of the different
characteristics that shape the structure of GAFI and impact its effectiveness.
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Chapter Six:
Legislative Framework and Institutional Analysis of GAFI

This chapter presents the discussion and analysis of the field of investigation
according to the methodology stated earlier in Chapter Five. It is divided into two
sections; the first tackles Law No. 17/2015, the current legislative framework that
governs the structure and functions of GAFI. It specifically lays emphasis on the new
amendments added, with the aim of empowering GAFI and giving it tools to attract
investors and promote investments. Whereas, the second section encompasses an
institutional analysis for GAFI, with discussion over its organizational and functional
elements, which according to the existing literature on investment promotion, constitute
the structural potential of any IPA that can in turn devise its efficiency in acting as a
country’s national IPA.
Both sections answer the main research question; “To what extent do the
structure and legislative framework of GAFI enable it to perform its role as the national
Investment Promotion Agency of Egypt?” They further help in identifying the gap
between the actual and desired performance of GAFI, enabling the researcher to come up
with recommendations for policy-makers in order to close the implementation gaps
between laws and practice and enable them to formulate policies and adopt better
mechanisms that contribute positively to the investment environment in Egypt.
I.

Law No. 17/2015- Current Law In Force

The circumstances within which the new legal framework came to light are worth
highlighting. Investment Law No. 17/2015 came out together with the Civil Service Law
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No. 18/2015, in March of year 2015, just one day before holding the Egypt Economic
Development Conference (EEDC) in Sharm el Sheikh. The
main target was sending a message to investors that
Egypt’s government is committed to administrative
and economic reforms by curbing bureaucratic
inefficiencies and solving the investment hurdles.
Therefore, Law No. 17/2015 introduced additional
guarantees (Figure 5), and a bundle of substantial
amendments to the preceding Investment Law No.
8/1997, seeking to attract more foreign investments.

Figure (5): Guarantees Offered by
Law No 17/2015
 Ensuring equality between local and foreign
investors in the right of owning land.
 Transferring of net
wageworkers abroad.

profit,

capital

and

 Solving investment disputes through means
previously agreed upon with the investor or by
arbitration.
 Introducing new mechanism for disputes
settlement between the government and
investors through a ministerial committee.

controversy among lawmakers and economic circles,

 Stipulating the necessity to prove criminal
intent to accuse the legal representative of the
company in crime according to investments
acts.

pertaining to its philosophy and adopted means for

Source: Author Constructed

However,

these

amendments

instead,

sparked

promoting and attracting investments.
This section addresses the philosophy of introducing Law No. 17/2015, through
focusing on the main themes that summarize its newly provided additional guarantees
and incentives. In addition, it also discusses some of the tools assigned to GAFI in light
of these new amendments, whereas examining their feasibility will follow in the second
section. The main themes are depicted in the following;
a. Giving More Tax and Non-Tax Incentives
The first key aspect in Law No. 17/2015 is based on offering more incentives,
both tax and non-tax, to investors. Tax and custom incentives were limited to a 50%
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reduction in sales tax6on machinery and equipment necessary for production that would
later be repaid when submitting the first tax return, in addition to dropping the customs
duties on equipment used for production from 5% to 2%7. Nevertheless, more non-tax
incentives 8 , such as low energy prices, subsidizing technical training programs for
employees, allocating lands at reduced prices, and reimbursing investors with costs paid
to get necessary utilities would be provided by GAFI, upon permission from the Cabinet
of Ministers, in a period that does not exceed 30 days from the investor’s application
request. These incentives are limited to projects that are either labor-intensive, or raise
the proportion of local content in the final product, or work in certain fields9, or projects
that are located in remote and deprived regions10. The law further grants GAFI punitive
authority that permits it to penalize the companies that violate the provisions of the law
by suspending, reducing, or terminating the exemptions and incentives they are
enjoying11.
There are two main problems to illustrate with these articles; the first is legal, it
lies in violating a firm constitutional principle that taxes and exemptions should be
applied by law, and not by administrative decrees, even if it comes from the Cabinet.
Therefore, the authority given to the Cabinet and in turn to GAFI, for granting incentives
and exemptions or amending their decisions, is not based on a solid legal foundation and
could easily be challenged. The second problem relates to the application. While, Article

6Sales

tax is set at 5% rather than 10%
23 of Law No. 17/2015
8Article 20 (bis) of Law No. 17/2015, and article 36 in the Executive Regulations
9Fields specified are Logistical Services; Internal Trade; Energy (production, transmission, or distribution
of whether conventional, new or renewable energy); Agriculture; and Transportation (land, maritime, or
railway).
10A full explanation for each kind of these projects is offered in the Executive Regulations; Article 36
11Article 93of Law No. 17/2015
7Article
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93 empowers GAFI by giving it punitive authority, and is perceived as “very important to
deal with blatant violations” (GAFI Senior Management Official, July 2016), exercising
these punitive powers by the Cabinet and GAFI without setting clear basis and guidelines
opens a door for corruption, and does not ensure against unfair preferential practices.
However, it is argued that, “as long as GAFI has a BoD with majority from business
people and not government representatives, this authority would not be misused. The
penalties would only be applied in extreme cases, where GAFI is desperate with
investors” (Board Member 1, July 2016). It also shifts GAFI’s role to a regulator rather
than a facilitator.
Another important point to highlight is the use of incentives as an important tool
for promotion. Former Principle Deputy Minister of Investment argued that, “without
incentives, the country would be imposing certain locations, industries, or sectors for
investment, not promoting them” (August 2016). Yet, the incentives offered in the law
were perceived unsatisfactory for attracting investors, for instance, a Senior Management
Official in GAFI viewed that “investors mainly invest in a location because of the tax
incentives, and non-tax incentives provided in the law are just ineffective” (July 2016).
This view is likely correct, since the law encourages investments in deprived and remote
areas, which are mostly inaccessible and short of basic utilities and infrastructure, thus
incentives in certain locations need to be sufficient to catch the investors’ interest.
Furthermore, the Former Principle Deputy Minister of Investment stated that, “the
general mood of the government and the country back at the time of issuing the law was
against offering tax incentives. Frankly speaking, the MoI asked for it, but the Ministry of
Finance refused” (August 2016). This statement shows that the government choice to the
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type of incentives is not in line with a promotional direction and is shortsighted. “If tax
incentives are designed in a correct manner, both the investor and the country will
benefit” (Researcher in the Senior Management Office, July 2016), since these incentives
will directly maximize the profit margin of the investor and will serve the State’s
development plan through investors improving infrastructure and extending services to
the deprived areas.
b. Facilitating Exit Procedures
Another amendment in this law relates to shortening the lengthy procedure of
exiting the market, where the law12 binds the concerned authorities once receiving the
liquidation request to notify the investor with any pending obligations within a maximum
period of 120 working days. If the said period passes without the investor receiving any
notification, then it is considered an automatic release of any liabilities.
This amendment would positively contribute to promoting and attracting
investments to Egypt, since it provides the investor with a guarantee for free exit from the
market without restrictions or lengthy processes.
c. Expanding the Scope of Work of the One Stop Shop
The third aspect of these amendments comprise the scope of work of the OSS,
which now extends to the announcement of the state-owned lands that are available for
investment, and the issuance of operating licenses; two ideas, in which each is fraught
with legal and practical difficulties that cannot be overlooked.
o Land Allocation
Land allocation has always been described as a huge problem and concern to

12Article

60 (bis)
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investors and investment in Egypt. Therefore, the amendments dedicated a full chapter,
from 13 articles13, to govern the disposition of land and real estate, in which it identified
several flexible mechanisms for their provision to investors, such as allowing the sale,
lease, or lease-to-own agreements of land and real estate, and giving investors the right of
usufruct up to 30 renewable years. The law also grants the government the right to
directly allocate state-owned land to certain “developmental projects” for free for a
period of five years. Accordingly, GAFI is given more power in this process of land
allocation, as the right to postpone full or partial payment of price by investors, in case of
sale agreements, until the actual operation of their project takes place. Also, by this law
GAFI is the only competent body in charge of offering lands as per the mentioned forms.
Therefore, all governorates and administrative bodies with authority over lands are
obligated to provide GAFI with full details and maps for lands that are available and
ready for investment.
Despite being perceived as accommodating to different investors’ needs, and a
commendable step towards solving the land allocation problem by putting it under the
control of a single entity, yet its applicability remains challenging due to the multiplicity
of administrative bodies with authority over jurisdiction and pricing of lands. For
instance, there are 4 main authorities that have jurisdiction over lands, namely the New
Urban Communities Authority; Industrial Development Agency; General Authority For
Tourism Development; and the General Authority For Reconstruction Projects &
Agricultural Development, in addition to the 27 governorates, where each has a number
of lands that can be allocated to investors. Each of these four agencies was responsible

13Articles

71-83
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for pricing its lands, in accordance to technical and financial criteria and had its own
regulations with respect to the disposition and allocation. However, Law No. 17/2015
abolished the law of Tenders and Bids 14 , which was governing the process of land
allocation and only pointed out to disposition. It further identified other four agencies
responsible for pricing15, without elaborating on the coordination mechanisms between
the different agencies. Also, the fact that these new amendments were imposed, without
coordinating with these concerned administrative bodies, requiring them to substitute
systems and regulations that were already being applied makes the enforcement of these
new aforementioned provisions more challenging.
Additionally, the law gives GAFI the authority to give away the state-owned
lands and real estate for free or at a discounted price, up to 50% less than its estimated
value 16 , even when investors are competing to purchase them. It also creates a new
system of lottery to replace the previously applied system of the Egyptian Tenders and
Bids Law17, in case of an excess demand for the lands available for investment. These
extensive powers may provide a fertile ground for corrupt practices to thrive, and open
the gate for favoritism that will cast doubt upon the entire process of land allocation.
o Licensing
As mentioned in Chapter Five, the OSS already exists. However, since the
beginning of its application, the OSS has been fraught with practical constraints in
regards to licensing and land allocation, which prevented it from being a fully functioning
system. Therefore, the main idea behind the amendments added in this area is to expand
14Article

71
General Authority for Government Services; Egyptian General Survey Authority; High Committee
for Appraisal of State Lands; and New Urban Communities Authority
16Articles 74 and 79
17Egyptian Tenders and Bids Law No. 89/1998
15The
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the scope of work of the OSS to become functioning beyond the phase of establishing
new companies. Accordingly, Law No. 17/2015 18 stipulates that GAFI issues all the
operating licenses and approvals required to start and run businesses in ‘specific
investment domains’, which are to be determined through a presidential decree, that shall
also stipulate the mechanism and procedures of direct coordination between GAFI and
other concerned entities. Also, for the second time, the law excludes the use of the
Tenders and Bids law, in cases where investors’ requests exceed the licenses available.
Rather, it states that a selection should be made in a transparent manner, in accordance
with the criteria specified by GAFI’s Board of Directors19.
The problem with these provisions lies in their ambiguity sometimes and their
consequences in other times. After nearly one year and a half from issuing the law, no
presidential decree is issued to identify these ‘specific investment domains’, for which
the OSS is to be applied. Whereas, the Executive Regulations, issued by the Prime
Minister20, listed 11 fields with over 30 different investment activities, stating that GAFI
is to release a guide for each activity. These guides shall indicate all the documents and
fees required by the different concerned entities, and which ought to be submitted by the
investors to GAFI, for obtaining the necessary licenses, approvals, permits, and contracts.
Consequently, GAFI is committed to act on behalf of thousands of investors seeking
operating licenses, which would turn GAFI staff into investors’ agents, dealing with the
entire State’s administrative apparatus, from ministries and their agencies to governorates
and its local councils.

18Article

51 (bis)
54 in law and article 20 in the Executive Regulations
20Prime Minister’s Decree No. 1820/2015
19Article
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This makes it an idea, nearly impossible to execute without major reforms in the
licensing regimes and a prior coordination between GAFI and the different licensing
entities, as confirmed by one of the board members, saying:
by designating yourself the issuer of operating licenses, you did a bottleneck. You
compiled all the bureaucracy to your end and you still cannot issue the licenses.
You created a backlog and you don’t have the capacity to handle it. (Board
Member 1, July 2016)
Furthermore, in case of having multiple investors competing for the available
licenses, the Executive Regulations lists only three criteria 21 that do not necessarily
ensure transparency or guarantee against favoring one investor over another. It also does
not refer to a mechanism to follow, in cases where competing investors similarly meet
financial and technical requirements.
d. Setting a Legal Framework for Dispute Resolution
Dispute settlement is another important aspect that had considerable attention in
the law, through adding a new chapter of 10 articles that creates three committees to deal
with disputes. The idea from this amendment is introducing a new mechanism for out-ofcourt forums, where an amicable settlement of investment disputes with the government
takes place, before investors resort to litigation and arbitration, where time-spent and
damages are usually high.
The three committees offer different levels for resolving disputes; the first is the
‘Complaints Committee’, which reviews any challenges submitted by the investor against
GAFI administrative decisions, relating to the implementation of the Investment Law and

21Article

20 – Criteria are the investment costs for the project; Past Experience; and Technology Used.
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its executive regulations. The decisions of this Committee shall be made within 60 days
from the date of submitting the challenge, and shall be final and binding on GAFI but not
on the investor. The law also stipulates on the creation of a ministerial ‘Committee for
Resolution of Investment Disputes’, in the Cabinet of Ministers, nonetheless its technical
secretariat is present inside GAFI and chaired by the Minister of Investment. The
Committee is mainly concerned with disputes that arise between investors and any
governmental body in connection with the implementation of the Investment Law.
Similarly, another ‘Committee for Settlement of Investment Contract Disputes’ is formed
to decide upon any disputes arising from investment contracts to which the State or any
of its affiliates is a party. The decisions of both Committees shall be binding to all
governmental parties, but again not to the investor, who still reserves the right to initiate
the claim again through resorting to state courts or arbitral tribunals.
Although the decisions of the committees shall be binding on all parties involved
in the dispute, the effectiveness of these decisions depend on the enforcement
mechanisms and the level of the commitment of administrative bodies; both of which are
still unclear. Other than that, the gradation and multiplicity of dispute resolution methods
is considered a strong advantage in this law and a powerful tool to GAFI. On one hand, it
provides the investor with several alternatives to resolve any problems, before going to
courts, arbitration, or even the Ministerial Committee of the Cabinet by turning first to
the technical secretariat in GAFI. On the other hand, it strengthens the promotion and
facilitation role of GAFI, which plays the mediator role between the investor and
different governmental entities, regarding itself the lawyer of the investor and thus
supporting him until he accesses his rights. And this itself is a powerful promotional tool
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in terms of image building, as a current Senior Official in MoI stated that, “this technical
secretariat is considered GAFI’s entry point in regaining the investors’ trust back, as
playing a role in settling their disputes provides them a practical proof on the
government seriousness in enhancing Egypt’s climate and procedures” (July 2016).
Moreover, there is a clear conviction among officials in GAFI and MoI, that local
investors are the real advocates and ambassadors who will help GAFI to internally and
externally promote to its self. Therefore, resolving the local disputes according to the
current mechanism is “one of the powerful tools with which GAFI helps investors during
their operating phase” (OSS Officer 2, May 2016).
e. Enhancing the Promotion Role
The final theme reflecting the philosophy of these new amendments can be
inferred from stipulating the creation of a “National Center for Developing and
Promoting Investment”, as an independent division, located inside GAFI22. It indicates
the need for separating the regulatory and promotional functions of GAFI, with the aim
of enhancing the later. Despite being a commendable idea, the method of its
implementation provided in this law is vague, confusing, and not well thought out.
Regarding its structure, the law states that the Center shall be an independent
division inside GAFI, and have a president, of high-executive cadre, to be appointed by
the Prime Minister. First,
This notion of ‘independence’ is not clear. Usually, the term is used in reference
to a pressure being exercised on an entity or a person, which necessitates
independence. It does not make any sense that the BoD, which is mandated with

22Article

96 of Law 17/2015
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promoting investments, would hinder the work of the new independent Center
with regards to its promotional duties. (Board Member 2, July 2016)
Separating between the functions of regulation and promotion is understandable
and valid, but this state of ‘independence’ is not clear with regards to whom the Center is
independent from. Second, the whole idea of initiating The Center violates the
administrative norms and protocols in force, because according to these amendments, a
division inside GAFI would have a president with an administrative rank that overrides
that of the Authority’s CEO and BoD. The law gives this president the right to issue the
internal bylaws and executive decisions related to financial, technical, and administrative
matters of the Center, without approval from anyone in GAFI, which supersedes the role
of the Board of Directors, even though the president of the Center is one of the board
members. Additionally, there are other obstacles related to performing its mandates,
however they will be highlighted in the following section discussing GAFI’s institutional
analysis.
This section tried to present an objective analysis of the features of Law No
17/2015, summarized in Figure (6), focusing on some amendments that directly affect the
work of GAFI and the investment climate as a whole. The analysis reveals that, although
the objective behind enacting this law is to restore investors’ confidence in Egypt’s
business environment, however it resulted in adding more ambiguity, due to vagueness of
some provisions, doubtfulness regarding enforcement mechanisms, and uncertainty about
proper coordination between the different governmental entities.
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Moreover, looking at what the law offers at each business stage shows that it did
not offer much to the investor. For example, the entry
incentives, which are considered a strategic tool
for attracting and promoting investments, were
not tactically designed according to a clear
methodology, which in turn questions their

Figure (6) Features of Law 17/2015
 Permits the government to participate in investment
projects, using state-owned land.
 GAFI has potential for giving free land.
 GAFI can provide land at reduced prices, at a
discounted rate with a maximum of 50% of the
estimated value of such land or real estates.

effectiveness in attracting more FDI and in
contributing

to

the

country’s

growth

 GAFI has the right to terminate the land acquired if
progress is not made with the project
and

development objectives. Similarly, its provisions  Creates a National Center for Development and
did not offer real, new improvements to simplify
procedures

or

accelerate

processes

and

transactions with regards to the land allocation

Investment Promotion to be under the auspices of the
Ministry of Investment.

 Shifts GAFI’s role towards a regulator and takes the
main promotion function from it.
Source: Author Constructed

and license obtainment systems. Therefore, the law does not guarantee a smooth
operating stage of business.
Also, with regards to the system of exiting the market, it needs further reform in
order to render Egypt more attractive to investment (Helmy, 2005). The law provided
only one amendment to shorten a lengthy process relating to market exit, but still, full
bankruptcy legislation that facilitates the exit process, and assures the potential investors
that they can reallocate their resources whenever needed, is lacking.
The following section completes what this section has started through an
institutional analysis of GAFI, which will further stress how significant legislative
stability can be, in impacting the investment environment in general and the investment
institutions in particular.
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II.

Institution Analysis

A. Organizational Elements
a. Legal Status, Mandate and Organizational Structure
Examining the IPA’s mode of creation; whether established by decree or law, and
institutional form; whether governmental; quasi-governmental; or private, are very
important to emphasize at the beginning of any institutional analysis. They represent the
legal foundation for an IPA, which directly influence its mandate and powers, and in turn
its capacity to promote investments.
GAFI was established by a presidential decree No. 284/1997 to be the main
governmental entity, in authority of regulating and promoting investments in Egypt,
through applying the provisions of Investment Law No. 8/1997 and its superseding law
No. 17/2015. Undoubtfully, the decree acknowledged GAFI’s importance, giving it a
solid legal foundation and a degree of autonomy that was further strengthened by the
issuance of Law No. 13/2004, and presidential decree No. 316/2004, wherewith GAFI’s
role was redefined from a regulation-oriented to a more promotion and facilitation
oriented agency, in addition its governance was strengthened, through appointing three
deputies to the Chairmen, and expanding the number of its Board of Directors (BoD) 23 to
include more private-sector representatives.
However, the latest amendment of Law No. 17/2015 has changed the governance
mechanism of GAFI 24 . Instead of having an independent Chairman serving as a key
communication channel between GAFI’s supervisory BoD and the concerned Minister of
Investment, the new law stipulates that the Minister of Investment chairs the BoD and a
23The

Board included 13 membersin total, Chairman appointed by the President; 3 Vice Chairmen; and 9
private sector representatives and other experienced individuals, appointed by the Prime Minister
24Article 88 of Law 17/2015
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Chief Executive Officer (CEO) manages GAFI; a change that will have adverse
consequences with regards to GAFI’s autonomy and positioning in the government, and
which will further be discussed in detail.
The consequences of this amendment demonstrate how significant the mode of
creation is, and how it is often indicative to the amount of power an IPA holds and the
degree of support it gets from other governmental entities. That is especially true because
decrees are often weaker than laws, since they may simply be modified, overturned, or
even dropped with any altering in governments or policies. In GAFI’s case, since the
decree whereby it is created has less legal power than a law, its capacity as an effective
IPA that is able to take dissuasive and proportionate enforcement actions may be
hindered by the maze of existing laws, in case these enforcement actions conflicted with
any other existing law. Thus, in the case of GAFI, its capacity to carry out its promotional
role effectively will be defined by the degree of political consensus among ministries
over its importance as an IPA, and contingent on the amount of support it gets from other
governmental agencies.


Mandate

As previously discussed, GAFI has a broad mandate, which is further reflected in
the large number of functional divisions it has. The extensiveness of these mandates and
their different natures require GAFI to wear many hats; a hat of a regulator as an
administrative body supervising investments that also has some jurisdictions of an
oversight nature; a second hat of a promoter and facilitator, carrying out promotional
activities and offering services to investors; as well as, a hat of a punisher in other times,
with an authority to reduce the tax exemption given to companies that violate the law and
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regulations. Interviews indicated that playing these numerous roles overburdens GAFI’s
staff and adversely affects carrying out the main promotion function, leading to a poor
performance from GAFI as a facilitator and promoter. A Senior Management Official in
GAFI stressed this saying: “We are being absorbed in our role as a regulator, which
makes us drift away from promotion and facilitation” (July 2016). Moreover, Board
Member 2 declared that, “the Board hardly finds time to discuss promotion in its
meetings” (August 2016).
Additionally, it is important to point out that, although the new law stipulated on
creating a “National Center for Developing and Promoting Investment” to avoid
overlapping responsibilities and allow effective coordination, yet it has not been created
or shaped despite the passage of one and a half years on issuing the law. The same
division in GAFI is still carrying out the promotion role. This delay in enforcement
supports the assumption that this law came with amendments that were not well thought
of, especially with regards to implementation. It further reflects that investment
promotion is not on the top of the government's priority list and questions the intentions
of the government towards it. Another point to highlight is the reporting mechanism of
the Center. According to the new law, the Center reports to the Minister of Investment
and not the Prime Minister, which again does not strategically serve in positioning the
Center favorably among other governmental counterparts.


Organizational structure

GAFI’s current structure is composed of a Board of Directors headed by the
Minister of Investment, a CEO, two Vice CEOs, and two assistants for the CEO. The
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Authority is organized into 12 functional divisions 25 , with central and general
departments underneath each. The following chart provides the general organizational
structure of GAFI.

Figure (7) GAFI’s Organizational Structure

Minister of Investment
Chairman of the Board

2 Assistants

2 Vice CEO

CEO

Source: The author; based on interviews with employees at GAFI, 2016

25 Technical

Office; Quality and Performance Improvement; Free Zones; Promotion; Investment in
Governorates; Investment Services; Investment Policies; Information, Documentation and Decision
Support Center; General Assembly; Economic Performance Follow Up; Companies; Legal Affairs. In
addition to a Media and Public Relations Central Unit, and a Security Central Unit.
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b. IPA’s Relationship to Government
Now that the legal structure and organizational chart are outlined, the political
positioning of GAFI in the government and how it is perceived among its counterparts
can be looked over in more depth.
GAFI has previously been an affiliate to MoI, nevertheless it reported directly to
the Prime Minister. It was also designated an autonomous agency, in terms of having an
independent budget, and an independent board of directors, responsible for everything
related to the Authority’s financial, administrative and technical matters, including its
organizational structure, internal regulations, executive resolutions and so on. This
autonomy has given GAFI an advantageous position among other governmental
institutions and leverage among all ministries. Abolishing this state “downgraded GAFI,
and put it in an inferior position among other government agencies” (Board Member 1,
July 2016).
Although, it’s often argued that the presence of a minister is essential for moving
things forward, setting a national policy for the State with regard to investment, and
identifying an economic direction, and despite the importance of all these objectives,
nevertheless, they can all still be achieved without breaching the autonomy of GAFI. In
fact, decreasing the degree of this independence would be impeding to GAFI with regards
to performing its facilitation mandate, since an additional layer is created between the
investor and GAFI for instance,
having a CEO, instead of a Chairman has stripped a large portion of GAFI’s
powers in favor of the Ministry, which in turn strips the delegated authority that
was granted to some heads of divisions. This would complicate and slow things,
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since the minister has become the ultimate decision-maker and it would be
difficult to regularly reach him. (OSS Officer 2, May 2016)
Beside the degree of autonomy, the effectiveness of GAFI directly depends on the
quality of political relations it has with other ministries and agencies and on their
perceptions towards it as an IPA. Interviews show an enormous weakness in mutual
relations. Coordination between GAFI and different ministries only takes place when
there is an urge, and is often limited to matters of high priority to the Country’s
leadership. However, when it comes to boosting promotional efforts, both the
coordination level and mechanism need extensive enhancement. For example, a
researcher in the Senior Management Office revealed that,
there is a sort of good collaboration between GAFI and different government
official regarding ‘improving the business climate’, because it’s a prime issue for
the Presidency right now. Nonetheless, ministries are completely uncooperative
when it comes to mapping the investment opportunities. (July 2016).
GAFI ascribes this lack of coordination to the fact that “government officials do
not communicate with each other, and do not want to share or convey information”
(Senior Management Official, July 2016). On one hand, this can be attributed to the
differences in cultures and mentalities; a culture of service versus a culture of enforcing
rules, which is further reflected in the mentality “between GAFI as a facilitator and other
agencies as regulators and implementers of law” (OSS Officer 2, May 2016). On the
other hand, it can be attributable to power-relations between ministries and agencies, or
from perceiving GAFI as a competing or threatening entity that aims at absorbing their
mandates, for instance OSS Officer 1 stated that,
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some agencies will never accept or allow GAFI to have an upper hand over them
or take any of their duties. These agencies depend on their institutional strength,
in terms of being founded by a presidential decree or having a strong chairman
who is connected with high-level decision-makers in the State. (May 2016).
Another illustration is given by the Former Chairman of IDA, who referred to a
stressed relationship between the two institutions that dates back to 2005, the time of
founding IDA, saying: “IDA was created with deliberate intent to be merged later with
GAFI, similar to the Companies’ Authority, which was merged with GAFI in 2004.
However, with a strong Minister of Trade and Industry back then, this move was
resisted”(August 2016). This example explains the resistance that some agencies hold
against GAFI, driven by fear that it becomes an umbrella agency that would absorb their
power. It also reflects the influence of the power relations among strong ministries in the
government.
Furthermore, there is a perception among some government officials that GAFI is
a valueless institution to them or an incompetent one in providing certain services. A
Senior Official at IMC26 stressed that, “GAFI has an unclear mandate, which does not
show how it complements other agencies” (August 2016). Additionally, on the ground, it
does not provide them with any sort of support. This reveals a missing link in the chain
between FDI and domestic investment. Likewise, the relationship between GAFI and an
important Ministry like MoPMAR, which plays the most important role in the process of
outlining developmental plans, is limited to mutual collaboration for holding conferences
or collecting data for outlining strategic documents like the Sustainable Development

26Industrial

modernization Center focuses on supporting the industrial enterprises and works with GAFI in
the matchmaking program.
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Strategy (SDS); Egypt Vision 2030. Principle Deputy Minister of Planning stated that in
preparing the national plan for social and economic development, MoPMAR sometimes
need studies on certain industries or sectors. However, they don’t consult GAFI, because
it “is mainly an executer and a regulator. Its promotional role is trivial and it promotes
for sectors, lacking vision and strategy” (August, 2016). Instead, MoPMAR resorts to
multinational corporations and specialized private sector companies.
Having an effective OSS, that assists investors with licenses services, is an idea
that has stumbled in execution. In investigating the reasons, Former Chairman of IDA
expressed high approbation to the idea of streamlining procedures and stressed that“IDA
doesn’t want to meet investors”, and affirmed that “IDA had several meetings with
GAFI’s senior management to discuss activating the OSS. However, it was GAFI’s
management that clearly stated their shortage of qualified people to deal with the permits
and licenses issue” (August 2016). Moreover, it is claimed that, the new law gives GAFI
a mandate it cannot fulfill and grants it undeserved rights, for example, Senior Official at
IMC expressed his disapproval on the law, and his astonishment regarding the related
articles wondering; “How can GAFI grant operating licenses, when it is not qualified to
do inspection and make sure that everything is in place? This is a sole right for IDA”
(August 2016).
This part reveals that Ministries and agencies are working in isolated islands.
Their relationship is not systematic or based on an effective coordination mechanism.
Efforts are fragmented rather than complementing and institutions’ effectiveness is tied to
the power and strength of each minister. Also, GAFI is imaged as an executer not as a
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promoter or a facilitator, and that’s why, it is perceived a competitor instead of a
complementing agency.
Developing high-quality political relations with government ministries and
agencies is key to providing a real facilitation and high-quality services for potential
investors, which would only be achieved through consensus on the important role of
GAFI as an IPA that facilitates only and does not execute.
Therefore, autonomy would provide GAFI with a degree of insulation from the
government and its conflicting relations. In addition, it would maintain its stability that
can be influenced by continuous reshuffling of governments, which will in turn give it a
greater chance for correcting any negative image and for positioning itself as a mediator
between investment opportunities and different government ministries and agencies.
These adverse consequences can also be minimized through a system of monitoring and
accountability, where each agency has a clear mandate, knows its integrative role in the
economic system, and is being held accountable.
c. IPA’s Relationship with Private Sector
As much as the IPAs’ relationship to the government informs the potential of an
IPA to attract FDI and promote investment, its relationship with private sector and the
degree to which they are involved within the IPA are often as important. In this part,
three things are being examined; the representation of private sector in GAFI’s Board; its
effectiveness in terms of its participation in GAFI’s functioning; and GAFI’s linkage to
other business communities.
The framework of connecting GAFI to the private sector is realized through
incorporating private-sector representatives into the Authority’s governance structure.
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Ever since its inception, GAFI had a BoD that has constantly been private sector
dominated. Today, eight out of 13 board members represent the private sector, including
the Chairman of the Egyptian Federation of Investors Associations; Representative of the
Egyptian Federation of Investors Association; President of the Egyptian Businessmen’s
Association; President of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce; Chairman of
Egypt’s Junior Businessmen's Association; Representative of the Federation of Egyptian
Industries; Chairman of BanqueMisr; and a member with legal expertise. Therefore,
when it comes to the representation, the private sector is definitely well represented.
However, its effectiveness depends on its functionality in the Board, which in turn
influences the effectiveness of GAFI.
Although the composition of the BoD is well thought out and inclusive to
powerful business representatives, its effectiveness is debatable for many reasons. First,
the board has been in limbo for 5 years; since the Revolution of 2011, the BOD meetings
have not been conducted regularly. There have been changes in some members and five
different ministers for investment have been in charge, where with each minister, the
BoD starts all over again. Second, with every board meeting, members get stuck with
administrative lots that need to be authorized and approved by the board, as reported by
Board Member 1,“the BoD time is consumed in approving administrative matters from
all divisions” (July 2016). Third and most importantly, there is an apparent difference in
views regarding the role the BoD should play in GAFI between GAFI’s senior
management and executive board, on one hand and the members of board from the
private sector on the other hand, for example, GAFI’s management reported that the
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private sector is well represented in the board by titles, but not by persons who
are operative in its governance. Almost all of the members hold several top-level
positions and have busy schedules; for example, when a sub-committee is formed
inside the BoD, I cannot ask any of them to head it. I need more dynamic people
who are involved in day-to-day activities (GAFI Senior Management Official,
July 2016).
Whereas, the board members consider themselves a consultancy board that works
with the executive team in GAFI to offer advice and strategic directions, but are not
supposed to get deeply involved in the execution matters. According to Board Member 1:
The members of Board have a vision and a wealth of experience in different
fields, which they share with GAFI’s management and executive team, and it
depends on them to turn this vision into reality and use this shared expertise. If
they are not going to use it, then they are useless. (July 2016)
These reasons reveal that the real problem in GAFI exists in its mandate, which is
“very wide and confusing; is it a regulator or a promoter, or an entity that establishes
companies, or manages the Free Zones? Being any of them is fine, but all of them is not”
(Board Member 2, August 2016).The Authority’s overwhelming mandate is impairing the
management from prioritizing setting a clear direction and a strategic vision to promote
investments in Egypt. Furthermore, it accounts for the unproductivity of board meetings
beyond dealing with administrative matters. Also, the variance in perspectives with
respect to the role of the BoD, discloses the gap between governmental and business
mindsets, which are not necessarily opposite, but they are different. It further uncovers
the misunderstanding of roles pertaining to setting a strategy and executing it, where
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setting a strategy should mainly be concerned with where GAFI wants to go and how
framing and guiding all of its decisions. That’s why it is a sophisticated process that
involves collecting and analyzing data, generating insights and identifying smart paths
forward. Whereas execution is about, what activities to fulfill, steady follow up, and
monitoring and evaluation. These roles here are not fruitlessly distinct, but rather
integrated.
One thing here is left to point out, although different Chairmen had the same
powers, not all of them exercised it in the same way. For example, in 2004, GAFI had a
chairman from a private sector background. He appointed 3 deputies, also from private
sector backgrounds and delegated authority to each of them. He realized the need for
another board to deal with the regular administrative affairs, accelerate things up, and
achieve progress. Thus, he used the power given to him by law and created a Board of
Trustees to include representatives and chairmen of concerned and influential
governmental entities such as IDA, Tax Authority, General Authority for Tourism
Promotion, Federation of Egyptian Banks, Federation of Egyptian Chambers of
Commerce and other organizations; representatives of Egyptian business associations;
prominent businessmen; Deputy Governor of the CBE; in addition to others of legal and
business expertise. Yet, the Board of Trustees ceased to function in 2010, and was never
formed to assume responsibility afterwards. This emphasizes the importance of
leadership, which realizes the challenges and does what it takes to efficiently achieve its
mandates. As stated by a Senior Official 2 in MoI,“the biggest challenge encountering
GAFI is the absence of a competent administration that has a clear mission and vision.
Whoever manages this authority needs to know exactly what he wants to do and where he
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wants GAFI to reach” (June 2016).
Apart from the board composition, the institutional linkage of GAFI with the
private sector is very weak or even nonexistent, although there are strong businesses
communities in Egypt, with which GAFI can establish constructive relationships and
enhance its overall performance. For instance, the American Chamber of Commerce in
Egypt plays a powerful role in enhancing economic and investment ties between the two
countries, through hosting all the American investors in Egypt and carrying out numerous
throughout the year. Similarly, the Federation of Egyptian Industries regularly meets its
counterparts in Europe and Arab countries. Also, there are many Chambers of Commerce
and Business Councils that are very strong business-to-business communication venues,
in addition to other Egyptian associations like the Egyptian Business Association and
Alexandra Business Association, which are very active and professional bodies.All of
these entities represent a robust linkage and offer strong communication venues to the
private sector, “however the relationship between GAFI and these organizations is not
institutionalized” (Board Member 1, July 2016).
In line with the evidence provided by Morrisset and Andrews Johnson (2004),
establishing an operational framework for interaction between IPAs and private sector
can positively contribute to increasing GAFI’s credibility among foreign investors. It
further enables the IPA to identify and understand the obstacles of investment from the
investors’ perspective, which would in turn empower GAFI to play a tougher role in
policy advocacy supported by the private sector. Finally, it can help GAFI move towards
a more quasi-governmental structure rather than a purely rigid governmental one, which
would make it easier to adopt a business culture closer and more suitable to its
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promotional efforts.
Lastly, the research findings correspond with Wells and Wint (2000), in stressing
that, “investment promotion is, in fact, more like activities typical of the private sector,
particularly marketing…[that] requires a continuous liaison with the private sector” (p.
56). However, findings disagree with Morrisset and Andrews Johnson (2004), in
considering that, “the higher the number of private members [in the IPA advisory board],
the greater IPA effectiveness” (p.49). Interviews indicate that the number does not
necessary reflect or guarantee enhancing the IPA’s effectiveness, but rather a clear
mandate and a strong leadership do, because only then, the participation of private sector
in the IPA functioning is guaranteed.
d. IPA’s Resources
Financial and human resources are a key indicator that determines the IPA
effectiveness. Since the focus is on the role of GAFI as a promoter, the research only
concentrates on the Promotion Division, where two elements are investigated as
indicative to the amount of attention and support GAFI provides to its promotional and
facilitation role and in turn denotes its effectiveness as an IPA. The two elements are the
percentage of staff dedicated to promotion from the total number of GAFI’s staff and
their qualification level, in addition to the size of budget allocated to promotion.
GAFI has a total of 2,39127 employees working in all its divisions and branches
across Egypt, out of which 97 employees are working in the Promotion Division. GAFI’s
Promotion staff is mainly devoted for the image building and investment generation
functions, in addition to providing after care and business matchmaking services. While

27The

statistics provided in this section were obtained from GAFI and analyzed by the researcher.
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the number of staff alone does not account for GAFI’s effectiveness in attracting
investment, however an only 4 percent of employees signify that the main attentiveness
of GAFI is not given to its role as a promoter.
In addition, through examining their qualification level and wage policies,
interviews indicated that GAFI is short of skilled people who can understand the business
strategies of promotion or deal with foreign investors, for example, although the Central
Promotion Department is internally divided by regions, a Senior Official in Promotion
Division conveyed that he is “suffering from the lack of language skilled staff inside the
division” (Senior Official 1, June 2016). Furthermore, a member of Board indicated that
calibers are very weak inside GAFI, saying: “a year ago, the BoD conducted interviews
for job promotions, and most of GAFI staff and those who are working on promotion
failed the exam” (Board Member 1, July 2016). This lack of skill and expertise can be
attributed to the poor wages provided, especially after the Revolution of January 2011,
since “the application of the maximum wage law has caused well qualified people to
leave”(Senior Official 1 in Promotion division, June 2016). It can also be resultant from
the absence of a “clear mechanism for human resource development for staff to be
upgraded” (Board Member 1, July 2016).
As for the financial resources, GAFI is considered one of the strong economic
authorities in Egypt, which has a sustainable funding source based on fees charged for
services provided to companies in the free zones. Its budget is always over one billion
Egyptian pounds, and interviewees confirmed that GAFI does not suffer from any budget
shortage, while, Board member 1 affirmed that “GAFI is a rich agency that has now
deposits amounting over 3 billion, with proceeds in dollars” (July 2016), and a Senior
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Official stressed that “GAFI supported the government and the Central Bank of Egypt by
over 1 billion Egyptian pounds in the past few years” (Senior Official 1 in Promotion
division, June 2016), there is no specified budget of the Promotion Division. Yet, there is
a line item allocation in the budget for promotional activities, including advertising,
publishing, printing, and PR costs, with an average of 22 million Egyptian pounds in the
periods between year 2011 and 2015.
Still, these amounts, although reported sufficient and denotes a potential to attract
FDI, do not necessarily indicate the effectiveness of GAFI as a promoter, since they are
not allocated based on a program or by function.
B. Functional Elements
Now that the significance of GAFI’s organizational elements, including its
relationship with the government and private sector, are outlined above, the institutional
analysis would be accomplished by putting emphasis on the functional elements as
indicated in the conceptual framework. Therefore, the following part scrutinizes each of
the four main IPA functions to explore how these functions influence GAFI’s capacity to
promote and facilitate investments and in turn attract more FDI.
Although the research primarily focuses on the ‘Promotion Division’, the four
functions are carried out through other divisions as well.
a. Image Building
Image building is the heart of investment promotion, and which if carried out
correctly, smoothens performing the three other investment promotion functions. It is
simply a marketing activity meant to portray a country as a trusted investment brand and
its investment climate as favorable. Therefore, it is fundamental for IPAs to give it
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considerable attention, especially in countries suffering from political and economic
fluctuations like Egypt. Investigating this function, the research focused on two main
elements; a strategy or plan being followed; and the tools utilized for achieving this plan.
After shifting its role from a regulator to a promoter, GAFI was very proactive in
building the country’s image. It followed a firm strategic approach to sell the country as
an appealing location, through conveying structured and consistent messaging of Egypt’s
value proposition and economic reforms to prospective and existing investors. This can
be inferred by looking at the FDI levels (Figure 2), which leaped from $2 billion in 2004
to $13.2 billion in 2008, in addition to the fundamental economic and legislative reforms,
as well as institutional reforms with regards to GAFI that were witnessed in the period
between 2004 and 2009. Additionally, during this period Egypt was named a top
reformer for four consecutive years in the Doing Business Report, and was a top regional
recipient of foreign direct investment. Nevertheless, this approach has weakened in the
past few years and highly needs revisiting, especially with the aftermath of January 2011
Revolution.
Interviews revealed that GAFI has a strategy for targeting investments; however it
does not have a clear strategy for building the image of Egypt. Even though, from an
image-building perspective, investment promotion cannot be viewed standalone from
promoting the entire country. Moreover, “the political context and security situation of
the host country always precede the investment decisions” (Former Principle Deputy
Minister of Investment, August 2016), and Egypt has witnessed many events that altered
the political and economic landscape and undermined confidence in the Egyptian
economy post 2011. All of these reasons require a competent IPA, capable of promoting
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Egypt’s image, and answering all questions relating to the political and security situation.
Therefore, the approach of GAFI that “is only limited to promoting certain sectors, but
not promoting Egypt” (Board Member 1, July 2016) needs to be reconsidered.
As for the tools currently used, they entail GAFI’s website, where information
about investing in Egypt is disseminated in an organized and consistent manner.
However, information on how to start a business is only available in Arabic. In addition,
the contact information for GAFI, and links to other governmental portals are also
accessible on the website, along with monthly and quarterly bulletins, which are also not
published in a regular manner; the last published ones date back to 2014.
Promoting abroad is another tool utilized by GAFI through cooperating with
Egyptian embassies abroad, commercial representation offices, and Egyptians
expatriates. GAFI has developed a cooperation program with the Commercial
Representation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) with the objective of holding
seminars and meetings with diplomatic and commercial attachés, where “the promotion
division usually meet the newly appointed ambassadors and present GAFI promotion
officers, in charge of the countries they are heading to, in order to facilitate future
cooperation together in attracting prospective investors” (Senior Official 2, Promotion
Division, June 2016). The Authority is also keen on opening communication and
dialogue channels with Egyptian expatriates, through participating in the annual
‘Consular Tours’28 to communicate the latest country reforms and promote investment
opportunities to them. GAFI also works closely with a contracted international PR
agency to assist it in organizing conferences, seminars and promotion missions and do the

28These

are annual follow-up visits arranged with MoFA to meet with Egyptians abroad.
87

necessary advertising.
While, all of these efforts and forms of cooperation are important and shall
contribute positively to promotion efforts and FDI levels, they still need to be guided by a
clear image or identity that the government wants to brand Egypt for, in order to increase
the effectiveness of these efforts. Furthermore, they are counted conventional, old tools,
despite having the opportunity to use more innovative tools, for example “Egypt has held
an International Economic Conference in 2015, in which a lot of world leaders and
biggest international economic institutions attended. However, it did not build on its
momentum to strengthen the country’s image” (Former Principle Deputy Minister of
Investment, August 2016).
The distracted performance on this function can be attributed to the different roles
GAFI plays, which impedes it from prioritizing promotion and therefore, its basic
functions. Another reason could be the revealed lack of consensus among the
governmental ministries and agencies on the significance of GAFI’s role. Most
importantly, the absence of a clear economic vision for the country as Board Member one
expressed “If we don’t have an economic vision, then what are we promoting Egypt for?”
(July 2016). All of these reasons stress the need for “an entity dedicated to promotion
with different sectoral focuses, yet promoting one image for the country” (Former
Principle Deputy Minister of Investment, August 2016).
b. Investment Generation
Investment generation is regarded as a more focused, strategic technique that is
adopted by IPAs worldwide. It is intended to draw FDI in higher quality and quantity,
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and should also help the country to attract investments in sectors that will serve and
enlarge the impact of its economic development objectives.
GAFI acts as an investment generator by following a sector-focused approach in
promotion by targeting 13 sectors 29. Initial information on each sector is available on
GAFI’s website, including Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), sector assessment, growth
drivers, and market structure. In addition, the socio-economic importance is displayed in
summary. There is also an ‘investment opportunities’ section under each of these sectors,
listing a number of projects with details on the allocation mechanism and the authority incharge for each.
However, GAFI’s targeting strategy does not seem tactically well defined. On one
hand, the number of targeted sectors, already identified and placed on GAFI’s website, is
huge for an effective targeting strategy. Also, there is no indication for any specific
investment opportunities under nine out of the 13 target sectors. It can be understood that
choosing 13 different economic sectors is aimed at reflecting the broad range of
economic activities in Egypt, where investors can invest in. However, a fewer number
would maximize the probability of attracting more FDI in quantity and quality.
Furthermore, beyond being ‘indicated in the State’s annual development plan’, the
rationale behind choosing these 13 sectors is not fairly clear to some of GAFI and MoI
employees, who are in different management positions, and responsible for promoting
projects and opportunities. For example, pertaining to the selection criteria of these 13
sectors, interviewees’ responses were contradicting and varied between, “these sectors

29Health

Care; Communications and Information Technology; Mining; Renewable Energy; Logistics and
Transportation; Pharmaceuticals; Real Estate and Construction; Agribusiness; Engineering and Electronics;
Textiles; Retail; Tourism; and Petrochemicals

89

were chosen to match the plan prepared by the Ministry of Planning, other than that
there is no logic for us as GAFI’s staff”(Assistant to the Minister of Investment, June
2016);“The choice is based on an old study conducted in GAFI, which designated these
13 sectors as promising sectors”(Researcher in the Senior Management Office, July
2016); “We are now targeting six sectors not 13, based on the current orientation of the
State”(Senior Management Official in GAFI, July 2016). It should be highlighted that the
six sectors indicated by the last respondent include different sectors than the identified 13
ones. These conflicting statements from interviewees reveal the lack of communication
among the internal hierarchical actors and other external governmental actors, who
directly work on investment, and further confirm the assumption that this targeting
strategy is not well defined.
On the other hand, the targeting strategy does not appear as clearly communicated
as it should among all other concerned and involved parties. For example, Commercial
Registration Offices abroad are technically affiliated to the Ministry of Trade and
Industry, and are mandated with enhancing the image and level of trade among other
countries. And since any investment will respectively raise the volumes of trade between
countries, these offices are considered as a vital partner in promoting and implementing
the investment strategy abroad. However, as Senior Official 2 in GAFI pointed out:
There are times when the goal of Commercial Representation is to increase the
investment between the two countries by making foreigners export to us, which
will in turn raise the trade volume in their favor. However, this drains Egypt’s
hard currency… [Moreover, when] GAFI communicates with them to explore the
possibility of convincing some of these investors to invest and open a business in
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Egypt, instead of exporting to us. Some are cooperative, but others are stubborn
and don’t collaborate at all. (June 2016)
From one side, this situation indicates and confirms a blurred or an absence of
communication of an overarching economic vision and thus a strong, well-defined
strategy for generating investments that should align with the country’s national
economic developmental objectives. This can be depicted in the different goals and
approaches of different ministries and agencies, which sometimes contradict or overlap.
The lack of unified strategy and coordination among different governmental entities
further reflects a policy gap among key ministries and government institutions that
impedes any effective promotion efforts, and negatively affects the investment
generation, which in turn, harms the country and adversely contributes to Egypt’s
economic growth and development.
From the other side, this poorly defined strategy could be resultant also from the
weak human resources in the promotion department and in GAFI in general. First, the
promotion is done by country not by economic sector. Shifting to sector-based units that
have qualified staff for different sectors will enhance the promotion efforts and will allow
GAFI staff to effectively follow up on their promotional campaigns. Second, GAFI does
not have a proper database because their public sector accounting is not functioning, for
example, Board Member 1, explains that
All budgets of companies are approved from GAFI, so they should have a
database of budgets, through which they could know the increase in capital
whether paid-up or issued share, the real investments, increase in employment,
and arrange all of this by sector. These data offer important ingredients for
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effective indicators to marketable sectors that can be used in promotion and
targeting. (July 2016)
Though stimulating investors all over the world, to pour their investments in the
Egyptian market, needs a well-articulated targeting strategy that aims at branding Egypt
and strategically placing it in the FDI-attracting markets. However, experience show that
investment generation works best, when the actual business climate in a country is better
than the perceptions presumed by investors (Loewendahl, 2001). Therefore, GAFI should
shift its promotional efforts to investment generation and sector targeting only after it
achieves a favorable image for business climate among potential investors. Only then can
GAFI focus on prioritizing some sectors and even some industries within these sectors.
Interviewees also stressed the need for having proper tools for investment
generation, namely tax incentives and reform agenda. Former Principle Deputy Minister
of Investment stated that, “he, who has the money, dictates on the country the type of
investment. You cannot impose a certain direction or sector on investors, short of drastic
tax incentives” (August 2016). Similarly, Board Member 1 stressed that, “an investor
knows very well where he wants to go and where the money flows. He only needs to see a
clear identified reform agenda” (July 2016) that guarantees a stable business
environment. This is only when GAFI can identify the possibilities and opportunities for
investors.
Thus, GAFI should primarily focus its promotional efforts on image building,
then set a strategy reflecting a long-term, thought of vision that considers Egypt’s current
and future challenges. Several approaches can be pursued for this aim. For example, the
strategy should consider attracting new and innovative types of investments, where Egypt
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intends to enter their market in the future. A second effective targeting approach would
be focusing on the interdependent industries that create synergy between the different
sectors, or targeting sectors that are highly oriented towards export.
Not only will these approaches strengthen the targeting strategy and enhance
Egypt’s opportunities in attracting more FDI, both in quantity and quality, but also will
inform GAFI and the government about the magnitude and kind of desirable change and
infrastructures that Egypt needs to pursue, in order to be capable of attracting more
sophisticated types of industries.
c. Investors Servicing and Facilitation
Investor servicing and facilitation simply completes and crowns the efforts of
creating a positive national image and generating investments for a country, by turning
them into real, tangible investments. This function entails OSS services, in addition to
business matchmaking and after care services.


One-Stop Shop

As identified in the overview, a OSS 30 system was established inside GAFI in
2002, and was later reformatted in 2004 to streamline mandatory procedures and abolish
redundant ones. It works under a separate Division inside GAFI, namely the ‘Investment
Services Division’, and has representatives from 47 ministries and government agencies,
offering multiple services to investors. It also has five branches

31

in different

governorates that offer almost the same services that are offered at the main Cairo OSS.
Coordination occurs regularly between all branches, which are all connected through an
internal department that follows up and coordinates between them and the central OSS in
30One

Stop Shop inside GAFI was established according to Presidential decree 79/2002.
Ismailya, Assiut, 10th of Ramadan, and 6th of October

31Alexandria,

93

Cairo. Ongoing efforts to exchange good practices between all OSS branches take place
through an annual program for unification and standardization of procedures, based on
which a “Procedural Guide for Internal Investment" manual gets updated.
The OSS provides investors with services during different investment phases. Preestablishment phase services entail responding to investors’ inquiries and providing them
with information about the different investment schemes, guarantees and incentives,
documents required for starting a business and the needed fees accordingly.
Establishment phase services cover the process of starting up a business, which normally
takes 48 hours and two hours in case the investor applied for a VIP application. Investors
only deal with a single window32 during this stage, where they complete all the required
documents is an automated process, filling out digital templates to accelerate the process.
Post-establishment phase services include a range of governmental services; technical
services; legal services; publication services; and tax exemption services. A summary on
each of these services is depicted in (Annex 1).
Since its inception, establishment has been the most successful and smooth
service provided through the OSS. Whereas, post-establishment services, in contrary are
regarded the weakest due to the lack of coordination between GAFI and the entities
involved in this stage, especially when it comes to services provided by entities with
land- jurisdiction and licensing authority.
According to Board member 1, the OSS fails to deliver these support services
32The

process takes place through a lawyer and a GAFI officer. The lawyer ensures first that all papers
presented by either the client or his agent, are complete and valid. Then, the officer acts on the investor’s
behalf in carrying out all the necessary steps for registering a company and following up on the whole
process that involves seven different agencies beside GAFI; Syndicate of Lawyers; The Union of Trade
Chambers; Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority; Public Notary; Commercial Registry; Tax Authority;
and the General Authority for Social Insurance. The investor is only required for signing in the Public
Notary.
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because “it has become a front office for all the bureaucracy in Egypt” (July 2016).
Instead of being a one single entity, where investors can obtain all their necessary
paperwork for starting and operating their businesses in a streamlined and harmonized
process, the OSS has become a one extra shop, where representatives from different
ministries are just liaison officers, whose role is limited to receiving requests and
necessary documents from the investor, and forwarding them to their respective entities
for the service to be performed there. They just follow up on the progress and deliver it
finalized to investors through the OSS. As explained by OSS Officer 1:
Despite the fact that 47 ministries and governmental agencies are currently
represented in GAFI, only a few have delegated the authority of making decisions
and approvals to their representatives inside the OSS. The majority of
representatives act as communication officers between the Authority and their
ministries or entities; they do not have real powers. (May 2016)
Having discussed the rationale behind the resistance and lack of coordination in
the ‘IPA’s relationship with Government’ element, and reviewed the poor level of OSS
performance in GAFI, the ability to enforce the provisions of the new law, whereby
GAFI is empowered to issue operating licenses, is in question. According to Board
Member 1, these provisions are inapplicable and “just added another additional layer on
the OSS, which makes working directly with the licensing agencies easier to the investor”
(July 2016). Similarly, Former Chairman of IDA views that this condition necessitates
“reforming the mechanism of issuing permits from the roots, or else the OSS will be of no
value” (August 2016).
Additionally, in the same month of issuing the new Investment Law No.17/2015,
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IDA prepared law giving it the right to regulate and grant operating licenses for industrial
projects, in addition to allocating and disposing lands under its jurisdictional authority.
Few months later, the Cabinet approved this law, ignoring the provisions of Law
No.17/2015 and the authority given to GAFI by it. This provides clear evidence on the
absence of coordination and communication between government agencies. Moreover, it
reflects the entrenched centralized nature of the public administration system in Egypt,
which resists any delegation of authority and views it as a tool to weaken their power,
rather than to facilitate processes and accelerate procedures. It also points out to the
individualistic perspective that some ministries and governmental entities adopt, instead
of adopting a more collective, constructive view that contributes to an overall friendly
climate for doing business and attracting investments.
It also harms the image building efforts and sends a negative message to
prospective and existing investors regarding the strength and applicability of the legal
framework in Egypt and reflects the government's inconsistency.
This situation further confirms that the top down approach of the government in
dealing with this problem is not useful. “Cutting various state agencies and departments
out of licensing procedures is simply unworkable in practice” (Former Principle Deputy
Minister of Investment, August 2016). In addition, imposing a law without coordinating
with the concerned parties would complicate rather than ease things.
Therefore, success of the OSS system will only be achieved when GAFI becomes
politically well positioned in the government and positively perceived by the different
ministries. Only then, different political actors and key agencies will align their strategic
directions to cooperate with GAFI rather than work in parallel.
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Business Matchmaking and After Care Services

Mostly, IPAs conduct matchmaking activities to associate foreign investors with
domestic investors and suppliers, aspiring to achieve a profounder integration of foreign
investors into the local economy (Wells and Wint, 2000). In GAFI, matchmaking service
is provided for new business or an established business that seeks expansion. It involves a
process that starts with filling out an application, and occurs upon requests from
investors, who fall under one of three categories; owns land but no funding or liquidity;
owns land and factory, but needs technology or know-how; has an idea and needs
everything. Promotion Officer 1 notes that, “the department matches either between local
and foreign investors or two foreign investors. But mostly, foreign investors demand a
match with another foreign investor because in their view, a foreign investor is easier to
deal with than an Egyptian” (June 2016).
Although there is a committed department to assist investors in finding investormatches, yet the interviews revealed that it operates unguided by a clearly defined linkage
strategy or program. On one hand, this implies a weak performance from the department
leading to low effectiveness of this service, which Promotion Officer 2 admits
saying:“matchmaking is mostly a lengthy process that goes through many negotiations,
and its results are not as hoped for”(June 2016). On the second hand, the absence of a
defined strategy denotes a shortage in determining the main objective behind offering this
service. A clear objective will devise strategies that would in turn transform into
programs and activities. In this sense, the objective must be defined to largely contribute
to Egypt’s overall investment promotion efforts and its national economic goals.
The admitted weak performance in this service could be attributed to GAFI’s
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weak relationship with private sector and the lack of involvement from GAFI’s board
into the functioning of the Authority with regards to its promotional mandate. As well as,
the lack of monitoring and follow up from GAFI’s leadership and executive Board.
As for the aftercare services, literature and best practices explain that aftercare
services are presented to investors who are in their post-establishment phase of a
business, where they are seeking support in reinvestment, expansions or upgrading their
existing project or business (Loewendahl, 2001; UNCTAD, 2007). However, GAFI’s
Aftercare Services department assists investors in the entry and operation phases.
Promotion Senior Official 1 justifies this saying that “the Promotion Division is the front
office for investors and complaints are received by more than one division, so when the
Aftercare Services Department receives a problem in any phase, it deals with it” (June
2016).
Similar to matchmaking, aftercare services are weakly performed as admitted by
Promotion Official 1, saying that, “the aftercare dedicated staff do not perform this job in
the appropriate manner”. Reasons for that include the weak allocated resources for the
department, especially the human resource element where “aftercare personnel tend to
be closer in style to governmental employees” (Senior Management Official, July 2016).
In addition, the need for a call center and a smart Investment Information System (IIS)
was stressed to help GAFI sort the complaints, and categorize them by division and
department, so that each can deal with theirs accordingly.
d. Policy Advocacy
Effective IPAs are not only distinguished by their ability to attract FDI, but also
with their strong role as advocates for improving the overall investment climate. Policy
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advocacy is mainly concerned with pushing for better investment legislations and morefriendly investment environment. Moreover, as indicated earlier in the Literature chapter,
there is evidence that policy advocacy is the most positively correlated IPA function with
respect to FDI inflows (Morrisset and Andrews Johnson, 2004).
GAFI has an entire division titled ‘Investment Policies’ that works on the
country’s micro indicators through 27 researchers 33 . The Division is mandated with
analyzing all the laws related to investment in Egypt, and examining all international
reports and surveys that are provided to GAFI via international organizations. It also
prepares adequate sectoral studies on investment opportunities in each sector, but mainly
gives the Doing Business Report of the World Bank an utmost attention, more than
anything other task, as a Senior Policies Official acknowledged:
The Doing Business Report is what we mostly care about in this division, even if
we are sometimes not convinced with its results. Still, it is what investors rely on
in making their investment decisions. Hence, we respond to the indicators and try
to fix the areas, where the report highlights problems.(May 2016)
Moreover, a ‘Coordinating Committee’ was formed by the Current Prime
Minister to follow up on Egypt's ranking in the Doing Business Report in early 2016. The
Committee34 is headed by the Minister of Investment, and includes all the relevant and
involved ministries in improving and simplifying procedures at all business areas tackled

3390%

of the researchers are graduates of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo
University. Almost all of them are Master's degree holders, while half are PhDs holders. They attend
international conferences and are being trained regularly.
34 The Committee’s first meeting was held in February, 2016, and was attended by the Ministers of
Planning, Follow-up, and Administrative Reform; Electricity and Renewable Energy; Housing and Urban
Development; and Trade and Industry; Governor of Cairo; representatives from Ministries of Justice and
Finance; Head of the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA); Chief Executive Officer of GAFI;
the Egyptian Credit Bureau; and other officials from the Ministry of Investment and GAFI.
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in the report. The first meeting resulted in an agenda on the short, medium, and long
term-levels to improve Egypt’s rank, and “the collaboration of all the ministries and
authorities to achieve more efficient processes that keep up with international standards
is positive” (Senior Management Official, July, 2016).
Despite the significant role GAFI plays by heading the Coordinating Committee
and following up with all ministries for reaching a satisfactory business climate, yet
GAFI did not have a loud voice in issuing the latest Investment Law No. 17/2015. Even
though it had prepared a draft that was amended several times, GAFI was ignored and
another version of the law was adopted despite the presence of disagreements and lack of
consensus over several articles.
The inability of GAFI to play a stronger role in advocacy can be ascribed to the
several reasons. The first is the lack of political support it gets from decision-makers.
Senior Management Official in GAFI stated that “the Authority does not get enough
support from policymakers” (July 2016) in addition, its “relationship with the MoI is
exactly like the relationship of any ministry with another; there is no relation”
(Researcher in the Management Office, July 2016). Both of which are related to the legal
status and political positioning of GAFI. FDI figures indicate that GAFI was strongest
and most effective during the period between 2004 and 2009, when it enjoyed some
autonomy, and its structure was closer to quasi-governmental rather than a puregovernmental. Back then, GAFI was well positioned among the government institutions
and was a key player in a broader policy process regarding investment, lobbying for
reforming investment policies and laws. This justifies why major institutional and
legislative reforms took place on the country level and inside GAFI and its OSS during
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that period, and which were positively reflected in the advanced ranks Egypt has held at
international reports and the highest FDI level that the country has achieved until today.
The second reason relates to the inability of policy makers and GAFI’s leadership
to prioritize functions and therefore allocate the necessary resources accordingly. Even
though there is evidence that policy advocacy is the most associated function with more
FDI, in addition it is the function that directly feeds the efforts of image building, GAFI
prioritizes image building and investment generation functions over policy advocacy and
investor servicing, which can be inferred by looking at the activities under the promotion
line item in their budget. GAFI needs to give considerable attention to its role as an
advocator and make sure its policy department is capacitated with highly qualified staff
that are capable of analyzing and recommending policies that contribute positively to the
decision making process.
The third and last reason relates to the linkage to private sector and the weak role
it plays in the functioning of GAFI. Strengthening and institutionalizing the relationship
with the business communities and councils existing in Egypt will enable GAFI to clearly
identify the problems in the investment climate from an investor point of view. Hence it
will enhance its ability to provide effective feedback to government policy-makers
regarding the enactment of investment friendly legislations and policies. Moreover, being
backed by the private sector will strengthen GAFI’s position and allow it to play a more
active advocacy role.
This section has complemented the first one in offering a full institutional analysis
for GAFI, where it explained the relationship between both organizational and functional
elements. It further portrayed how GAFI performs each of the image building; investment
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generation; investor servicing and facilitation; and policy advocacy functions, all of
which that characterize the functional strength of an IPA.
This chapter answered the main research question of this study, illustrating that
the structure of GAFI does not contribute to its likelihood of being an effective agency
promoting and facilitating investments in Egypt. The analysis shows how an effective
structure is inextricably interdependent on both legislative and institutional factors, and
portrays how the institutional elements in particular have been largely dependent on and
shaped by the overall legislative framework of investment. It further shows that the Law
No.17/2015 estranged both the business community and other government ministries,
with regards to the one-stop shop and land allocation policies, which led to disagreements
and divisions between GAFI and other ministries and agencies. All of which negatively
influenced the ability of GAFI to streamline procedures and facilitate investment
processes.
The analysis also highlights other factors influencing the effectiveness of GAFI to
attract more FDI. On top of these factors is the absence of a clear overarching economic
vision for the country, which therefore, produced an ambivalent policy framework for
investment. This blurry policy framework cannot help policy makers neither to identify
priorities nor to evaluate policy challenges while seeking to attract more FDI that
contributes to the sustainable development of the country and the economic wellbeing of
its citizens. The Egypt Economic Development Conference can be a palpable
demonstration to the consequences of not having a clear economic vision and a precisely
outlined policy framework with regards to investment. There was a political buy-in
during this period that promoting investment is a quick way for recovering the economy.
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Moreover, a new investment law was just issued and the time was right for GAFI to play
a more instrumental role, especially that the conference was successful and resulted in
signing many millions-worth contracts and memorandums of understanding for projects.
However, GAFI failed to play an influential role, and most of these projects have been
halted because the government was unable to resolve the pressing investment problems
and ministries did not have a clear reform agenda to act together upon. In addition,
although the government has launched Egypt’s Sustainable Development Strategy 2030
(SDS 2030) in February 2016, it is perceived as a weak, incomprehensive, and nondetailed policy document that is full of parameters without signaling the implementation
mechanisms. It was clear that Egypt has missed seizing the opportunity to capture and
build on the momentum of the Conference to define a real economic vision and
investment policy framework that guide and encourage further legislative and
administrative reform.
Another important factor would be the leadership of GAFI; most of the
interviewees have expressed their concerns about the absence of a strong leadership that
can achieve transformational change and lead the institution towards real and substantial
outcomes through building a strong relationship and effectively communicating with the
employees and other external stakeholders, understanding the context in which the
investment promotion operates and adaptive towards the changing and fluctuating status
of the economy in the country.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion and Recommendations

I.

Conclusion
The main objective of this research was to portray a complete picture of GAFI’s

potential to attract more investments. Although, there is no a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model to
follow, with respect to the most effective IPA structures, best practices and rigorous
studies have verified a number of elements that highly influence the capacity of IPAs to
perform their functions and hence impact their performance with regards to quantity and
quality of FDI attracted.
Based on this, an institutional analysis for GAFI was carried out, framing its
structure’s potential in several organizational and functional elements. The findings
reveal that its overall structure does not contribute to the likelihood of being an effective
agency responsible for investment promotion and facilitation in Egypt. Hence significant
changes and reforms are needed to improve its status quo and consequently contribute to
enhancing the economic and social situation in the Egypt.
The institutional analysis shows that GAFI’s legal status account for weakening
its structure. The decree whereby GAFI is created does not support maintaining its
stability. It was modified several times, resulting in affiliating GAFI with different
ministries and ministers over the past 10 years. Therefore, its political position, degree of
autonomy and authority were either reinforced or marginalized; only depending on the
power of the entity or minister it is affiliated to. Accordingly, the legal status of GAFI
impedes it from being positioned as a stable, soundly functioning agency. Moreover, as
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per its relationship with government, the capacity of GAFI to promote for other
ministries has always been constrained, when it follows a minister, unless this minister is
influential. Its leverage becomes less among other governmental agencies and entities.
Therefore, in Egypt, all other ministries are currently promoting to themselves. This
results in a fragmented promotion effort, and an absence for a mechanism to promote one
image to Egypt.
Similarly, GAFI’s linkages with private sector are found only limited to
incorporating private-sector members in its board of directors, despite the presence of
many active business councils and organizations in Egypt. Moreover, even though
GAFI’s Board of Directors enjoys having diverse and strong business representatives,
their contribution in GAFI’s role as a promoter and an advocator for better policies is not
significant. With regards to resources, GAFI is considered a strong economic entity, with
abundance of financial resources. However, these resources do not appear well directed
towards boosting the promotion efforts and enhancing the skills of the promotion staff.
Calibers working on investment and facilitation lack talent and expertise, especially with
regards to investor orientation, language skills and track record.
Indisputably, the lack of effectiveness in the organizational elements is indicative
to the deteriorated situation of the promotional functional elements. Scrutinizing how
GAFI performs each of four IPA functions exposed the absence of an overarching
economic vision and therefore a clear guiding investment promotion strategy, based on
the country’s competitive strengths, which further informs on a lack of communication
between GAFI and the governmental ministries and agencies.
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This alone reveals that the four main IPA functions are carried randomly and in
parallel, rather than prioritizing the functions that are more significant and contributing to
the current political and economic situation of Egypt. The country suffered from political
instability and insecurity after 2011 Revolution passing by 30 June in 2013 and toppling
another regime. In addition, it is passing through another phase of economic instability
due to unpredictability of fiscal policies. All of which are events that require the GAFI to
prioritize the efforts towards the country’s “image building” and therefore, focus on
policy advocacy and investors servicing functions that directly pour into branding Egypt
as a favorable investment location.
In terms of the legislative framework that governs GAFI, despite the new
investment Law No.17/2015 provides investors with more incentives and guarantees
regarding the facilitation of procedures, the Law complicated the process, especially with
regards to obtaining the operating licenses and land allocation, as it adopted a top-down
approach in imposing the amendments without considering or coordinating with the
implementing agencies.
Lastly, it is important to highlight that all reform initiatives must be backed by
strong political will and consensus over investment priorities. Though this political will is
present in the case of Egypt, yet it will not be effective unless it is translated into welldefined strategy that guarantees the coordination of all government institutions, as well as
private sector in a joint effort towards enhancing the overall investment climate.
Moreover, this strategy will not be effectively implemented unless bounded by a clear
monitoring and evaluation mechanism.
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II.

Recommendations
The recommendations of this research are derived from synergy between the

viewpoints of the interviewees and the analysis of the researcher, perceiving GAFI as a
State agency that is complicated and tangled with other bureaucratic agencies. GAFI will
not move forward without progressive reform, however, any attempt for dismantling and
rebuilding it would be very difficult, given the State administrative apparatus, complexity
of laws, centralized bureaucracy, and turf battles. The following points summarize a set
of recommendations that could enhance the effectiveness of GAFI to propagate its
promotion role:
1. Legislative Aspects
The following proposed recommendations are focusing on the overall legislative
framework of investment in Egypt, and are not limited to the investment Law
No.17/2015.


Efficient bankruptcy law must be issued to deal with the insolvency issues to
facilitate the market entry and exit barriers for large and small investors.



Following a clear State’s economic vision, incentives in the investment law shall
be identified per targeted sectors and industries, accompanied by other incentives
offered to the local feeding industries.



Investment law must be amended to assign obtaining the licenses to third party to
facilitate the operating business stage.



Abolish the MoI and only keep GAFI to overcome the redundant roles between
both entities and reduce the bureaucratic layers. In addition, transform the
institutional form of GAFI into a quasi-governmental rather than a purely
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governmental institution and maintain its autonomy. This can be achieved
thorough affiliating GAFI to either the President or the Prime Minister, in order to
be insulated from the governmental agencies’ pressures and overlap. This will
enable GAFI to situate itself in a non-threatening position, as a mediator between
various investment opportunities of the different governmental agencies and FDI.
2. Institutional Aspects


Ensure the separation between GAFI’s role as a regulator and executor on one
side, and its role as promoter and facilitator on the other side, accordingly
segregate the functions and powers of each.



Once the separation between the roles is completed, focusing on investment
promotion can be an opportunity for GAFI to act as an agent for change that
would help the promotion division move forward, and lead other divisions to
change later. This requires:
 Another layer of top management is completely dedicated only to
enhancing the promotional role of GAFI.
 This top management is suggested to be, one of the Deputy Chairmen to
lead the restructuring of the division and to provide clear monitoring and
evaluation mechanism that ensures promotion functions are carried out
appropriately.
 The Deputy Chairman can be assisted by business development top-notch
calibers to assist him in developing a plan for promoting certain industries,
based on Egypt’s competiveness in different sectors. This can be achieved
through creating a scoring matrix for each sector to identify its drivers and
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impediments for growth. This scoring matrix would be used as potential
for cooperation with other governmental ministries and agencies to boost
the drivers and abolish the impediments in each sector.


Based on the scoring matrix GAFI shall develop a National Investment Plan to
be endorsed by all sectoral ministries. This plan should strategically focus on
attracting FDI that contributes to the local economic development in the country.



The promotion division must be restructured and organized by economic sector.
Also it must be mandated with clear responsibilities for country image building,
investment generation, linkage promotion and policy advocacy.



Promotion division must have a separate budget that reflects the promotion
functions, outlining the different activities under each. This would help GAFI to
follow up and evaluate its performance in each of the functions.



Develop a capacity building plan for the promotion staff that would orient them to
adopt a business-like culture that is more investor friendly.



Institutionalize relations with the various influential business councils and
communities, as well as enhance the relationship with the governmental agencies
and entities through a clear communication strategy. This can be accomplished
through establishing two units, each of which is dedicated to strengthening and
maintaining GAFI’s linkages to the private sector and its relationship with
governmental entities.



GAFI should primarily focus its promotional efforts on image building and
investor servicing. It should develop a well-articulated plan for branding Egypt,
through an international campaign. This plan should tackle issues related to
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security, economic stability, and foreign currency, beside demonstrating
investment opportunities in different governorates & sectors.


The current economic condition of Egypt requires GAFI to direct its targeting
approach towards interdependent industries that create synergy between the
different sectors, and the export-oriented industries.



GAFI needs to play a stronger role as an advocator for better investment policies
and climate. It should closely work with the aftercare and facilitation departments
to identify the investors’ problems and solve them. GAFI should also have a clear
mechanism for reporting, following up, and measuring the progress.

All of these recommendations will enable the government to define the
orientation of the Egyptian economy in terms of being an export-led or a consumer based
or otherwise. This constitutes the solid ground for formulating robust policy framework
for investment, based on which the policy-makers will be able to clearly set priorities,
evaluate policy challenges, and direct their efforts and resources towards attracting FDI
that contributes to the sustainable development of the country and the economic
wellbeing of the citizens.

110

References
Abdel-Latif, A., & Schmitz, H. (2011). The politics of investment and growth in Egypt:
Experimenting with a new approach. Development Policy Review, 29(4), 433458.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as a fundamental cause
of long-run growth. Handbook of economic growth, 1, 385-472.
Anderson, J., & Sutherland, D. (2015). Developed economy investment promotion
agencies and emerging market foreign direct investment: The case of chinese FDI
in canada. Journal of World Business, 50(4), 815. doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2015.04.005
Banerjee, S. G., Oetzel, J. M., &Ranganathan, R. (2006). Private provision of
infrastructure in emerging markets: Do institutions matter? Development Policy
Review, 24(2), 175-202. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7679.2006.00321.x
Buchanan, B. G., Le, Q. V., & Rishi, M. (2012). Foreign direct investment and
institutional quality: Some empirical evidence. International Review of Financial
Analysis, 21, 81-89. doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2011.10.001
Casey, W. L., Jr. (2013). National investment promotion policies and foreign direct
investment flows. International Journal of Business and Economics Perspectives
(IJBEP), 8(1), 14.
CBE. (2014). Annual Report 2013/2014. Cairo: Central Bank of Egypt. doi:
http://www.cbe.org.eg/NR/rdonlyres/236CD24D-07CB-4999-AC8A611F2BA36711/3018/AnnualReport20132015.pdf
Charlton, A., & Davis, N. (2007). Does investment promotion work? The B.E. Journal of
Economic Analysis & Policy, 7(1), 42. doi:10.2202/1935-1682.1743
DB. (2015). Doing Business Report. The World Bank Group.
Della Porta, D., &Vannucci, A. (1999). Corrupt exchanges: Actors, resources, and
mechanisms of political corruption. Transaction Publishers.
Dixit, A. and R. Pindyck, 1993, Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ).
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., & Shleifer, A. (2002). The regulation of entry. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 117(1), 1-37. doi:10.1162/003355302753399436

111

Dobronogov, A., Iqbal, F., & Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran,
and Turkey. (2004). Economic growth in Egypt: Constraints and determinants.
Cairo, Egypt: Economic Research Forum.
Domeisen, N. (2003). Is there a case for national branding?. In International Trade
Forum (No. 1, p. 14). International Trade Centre.
Dumludag, D. (2009). An analysis of the determinants of foreign direct investment in
turkey: The role of the institutional context. Journal of Business Economics and
Management, , 15-30.
Dunning, J. H. (2009). Location and the multinational enterprise: A neglected
factor? Journal of International Business Studies, 40(1), 5-19.
doi:10.1057/jibs.2008.74
Farah, N. R. (2009). Egypt's political economy: Power relations in development.
Cairo;New York;: The American University in Cairo Press.
Handoussa , H. , & Louis , M. ( 2003 ). Brownfield investment in emerging markets: The
case of Egypt. DRC working papers: Foreign direct investment in emerging
markets .London : Centre for New and Emerging Markets, London Business
School .
Harding, T., &Javorcik, B. S. (2011). Roll out the red carpet and they will come:
Investment promotion and FDI inflows. The Economic Journal, 121(557), 14451476. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02454.x
Hausmann, R., Rodrik, D., & Velasco, A. (2008). Growth diagnostics. The Washington
consensus reconsidered: Towards a new global governance, 324-355.
Helmy, O. (2005). The efficiency of the bankruptcy system in Egypt. Egyptian Center for
Economic Studies.
IPRI. (2015). The International Property Rights Index 2015. Retrieved from The
International Property Rights Index 2015:
http://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/country?s=egypt
Jackson, M. K. (2013). Ownership, Corporate Governance and Liquidity in Caribbian
Firms. Brisbane, Australia.
Ketkar, K. W., Murtuza, A., &Ketkar, S. L. (2005). impact of corruption on foreign direct
investment and tax revenues. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting &
Financial Management, 17(3), 313.
Lim, S. (2008). How investment promotion affects attracting foreign direct investment:
Analytical argument and empirical analyses. International Business Review,
17(1), 39-53. doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2007.09.001
112

Loewendahl, H. (2001). A framework for FDI promotion. Transnational Corporations,
10(1), 1-42.
Lucke, N., &Eichler, S. (2016). Foreign direct investment: The role of institutional and
cultural determinants. Applied Economics,48(11), 935-956.
doi:10.1080/00036846.2015.1090551
Masry, M. (2015). Does Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Really Matter in Developing
Countries? The Case of Egypt. Research in World Economy,6(4), p64.
MIGA. (2016). Investment Generation Toolkit. Retrieved 5 2016, from The World Bank
Group: https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/toolkits/investment-generationtoolkit/module6-step1_make-the-transition-from-image-building-to-investmentgeneration.cfm
Miškinis, A., &Byrka, M. (2014). The Role of Investment Promotion Agencies in Attracting
Foreign Direct Investment. Ekonomika/Economics, 93(4).
MoF. (2013). The Monthly Statistical Publication of the Ministry of Finance. Retrieved
2015, from Ministry of Finance:
http://www.mof.gov.eg/MOFGallerySource/English/Reports/monthly/2013/Jan2013/f
ull%20version.pdf
MoI. (2015). Investment. Retrieved June 2016, from Ministry Of Investment:
http://www.investment.gov.eg/en/invest/invest.aspx
MoP. (2015). Retrieved from Ministry of Planning.
Moore, M., & Schmitz, H. (2008). Idealism, realism and the investment climate in
developing countries.
Morisset, J., & Andrews-Johnson, K. (2004). Effectiveness of promotion agencies at
attracting foreign direct investment. United States: World Bank Group.
doi:10.1596/0-8213-5606-2
Nilov, K. N. (2011). Legal Guarantees for International Investment according to the
Legislation of the Russian Federation. Baltic Region, 3, 5-10. doi:10.5922/20798555-2011-3-1
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance.
Cambridge;New York;: Cambridge University Press.
North, D. C., &Weingast, B. R. (1989). Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of
institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England. The Journal
of Economic History, 49(4), 803-832. doi:10.1017/S0022050700009451
113

OECD. (2011). Competitiveness and private sector development: Sector competitiveness
strategy. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
OECD. (2014). Business Climate Review of Egypt. Retrieved from
http://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/BCR%20Egypt_April29_with_cover.
pdf
OECD. (2015). Strengthening Chile’s investment promotion strategy. OECD.
OECD. (2015). Policy Framework for Investment (2015 ed.). Paris: OECD Publishing.
Pritchett, L. (2008). “Implementing Growth Analytics”. Paper prepared for DFID
Growth Analytics Workshop. Accessed 27 June 2009,
“http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~lpritch/”.
Rodrik, D.(2005). Growth strategies, in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds), Handbook of
Economic Growth, Edition 1, Vol.1, Chapter 14, Elsevier: 967-1014.
Sader, F. (2000). Do One Stop Shops Work?.Washington: Foreign Investment Advisory.
Saif , I., &Ghoneim, A. (2013). The Private Sector in PostRevolution Egypt. Washington,
D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Sirr, G., Garvey, J., & Gallagher, L. (2012). A quantitative approach to guiding the
promotional efforts of IPAs in emerging markets. International Business
Review, 21(4), 618. doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2011.07.006
Stampini, M., Leung, R., Diarra, S. M., &Pla, L. (2013). how large is the private sector in
africa? evidence from national accounts and labour markets. South African
Journal of Economics, 81(1), 140-165. doi:10.1111/saje.12000
Stasavage, D., 2002, private investment and political institutions. Economics and Politics
14, 41–63.
Stone, A. (2006). Establishing a Successful One Stop Shop: The case of Egypt. Retrieved
2016, from International Monetary Fund:
https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2006/arabco/pdf/stone.pdf
Sun, X. (2002). How to promote FDI? The regulatory and institutional environment for
attracting FDI. Foreign Investment Advisory Service.
TI. (2015). Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved from Transparency International:
http://www.transparency.org/country/#EGY

114

Torriti, J., &Ikpe, E. (2015). Administrative costs of regulation and foreign direct
investment: The standard cost model in non-OECD countries. Review of World
Economics, 151(1), 127-144. doi:10.1007/s10290-014-0200-y
Trník, M. (2007). The role of investment promotion agencies at attracting foreign direct
investment and their impact on economic development in Central Europe
(Doctoral dissertation, Central European University).
UNCTAD. (1997). Survey of best practices in investment promotion. In The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).[Online] Available:
www.unctad.org/asit
UNCTAD. (2007). Aftercare: A Core Function in Investment Promotion.
UNCTAD. (2016). World Investment Report. Geneva: United Nations.
Valeriani, E., &Peluso, S. (2011). The impact of institutional quality on economic growth
and development: An empirical study. Journal of Knowledge Management,
Economics and Information Technology, 1(6), 274-299.
WAIPA. (2012). The WAIPA Annual Report 2011- 2012. World Association of
Investment Promotion Agencies, Geneva.
WEF. (2015). The Global Competitiveness Report. Retrieved from World Economic
Forum: http://reports.weforum.org/the-global-competitiveness-report-2013-2014/
Weigel, D., Gregory, N., & Wagle, D. (1997). Foreign direct investment. Lessons of
experience series ; no. 5. Washington DC: World Bank.
Wells, L. T., &Wint, A. G. (1990). Marketing a Country: Promotion as a Tool for
Attracting Foreign Investment (Washington, DC: International Finance
Corporation).
Wells, L. T., &Wint, A. G. (2000). Marketing a country: promotion as a tool for
attracting foreign investment. IFC-International Finance Corporation.
Whyte, R., Ortega, C., & Griffin, C. (2011). Investment regulation and promotion: Can
they coexist in one body. World Bank Group Investment Climate In Practice,
(16).
Wint, A. G. (1992). Public marketing of foreign investment: Successful international
offices stand alone. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 5(5).
World Bank. (n.d.). Doing Business Report Series. Retrieved from Doing Business:
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/

115

Young, S., & Hood, N. (1994). Designing developmental after-care programmes for
foreign direct investors in the European Union. Transnational Corporations, 3(2),
45-72.
Young, S., & Hood, N. (1995). Attracting, managing and developing inward investment
in the single market. Behind the Myth of the European Union: Prospects for
Cohesion, 282-304.
Zakari, A., Aliero, H. M., & Abdul-Quadir, A. B. (2012). The role of Nigerian
investment promotion commission (NIPC) in attracting foreign direct investment
in Nigeria. European Scientific Journal, 8(7), 149.
Zurawicki, L., & Habib, M. (2010). Corruption and foreign direct investment: What have
we learned? The International Business & Economics Research Journal, 9(7), 1.

116

Annex 1

Post-Establishment Services
 Issue the residence permits and their renewals (1 year then renewed another 1 year
then 3 years; depending on his seriousness in investment)
Governmental
Services

 Issue work permits and their renewals for foreigners (1 foreigner for every 9
Egyptians)
 Give recommendation regarding bringing labor and dependents
 Approve Foreign Companies Representative Offices and Branches (opening –
modifying – closing)
 Ratifying importing and exporting invoices

Technical
Services

 Giving recommendations on custom duties regarding importing machines and
equipment necessary for projects operation
 Giving recommendations on getting exemptions from registration fees and taxes for
land contract, mortgages, and loans
 Ratifying meeting minutes for either the board of directors or general assembly
(ordinary or unusual)

Legal
Services

 Issuing decrees of the legal amendments in companies ’ articles of association
 Modifying the company's form, name, type of activity, number of partners)
 Closing of companies

Publication
Services

Tax
Exemption
Services

 Publishing company's contracts, articles of association and any related legal
amendments
 Publishing special decrees and documenting copies of Investment Gazette to be
ratified by Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Forming committees, which determine date of business start up and its executive
status and ratifying its reports.
 Issuing certificate of tax exemption

Source: Author, based on the interviews
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